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ABSTRACT—A healthy system of shareholder voting is crucial for any 
regime of corporate law. The proper allocation of governance power is 
subject to debate, of course, but the fitness of the underlying mechanism used 
to stuff the ballot boxes should concern everyone. Proponents of shareholder 
power, for instance, cannot argue for greater control if the legitimacy of the 
resulting tallies is suspect. And those who advocate for board deference do 
so on the bedrock of authority that reliable shareholder elections supposedly 
confer. 
Unfortunately, our trust in the corporate franchise was forged during an 
era that predates modern complexities in the way that stock ownership is now 
tracked and traded. We do not trace shares, and any clear-eyed look at the 
conferral of voting rights via back-end stock clearing practices is unsettling. 
Evidence of the various entanglements crops up from time to time—in the 
form of questionable voting outcomes or disputes about standing for 
shareholder lawsuits—but the underlying problems are systemic, not 
episodic. Our stock clearing system is a kludge. 
This is an important moment for corporate law, however, because new 
technology is approaching a state where clearing and settlement systems may 
soon support traceable shares. The rise of distributed ledgers and blockchain 
technology is poised to allow for specific share identification and precise 
records of share provenance. This may sound like an uninteresting technical 
sideshow, but as this Article will argue, the impact of traceable shares on 
corporate law will be profound. It will change the structure of shareholder 
lawsuits, alter the allocation of corporate governance rights, and require 
lawmakers to rethink fundamental principles of shareholder responsibility 
for corporate misdeeds. 
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INTRODUCTION 
After you buy a share of stock, what happens next? How does the 
resulting settlement and transfer of your new ownership certificate take 
place? For most corporate law scholars, these are especially uninteresting 
questions. Front-end trading strategies and flash algorithms may be 
exciting,1 but the recessed plumbing of back-end clearing processes is not. 
Most people just ignore the topic. We assume that a share of stock will 
eventually “get” to its new owner—along with all the legal rights of 
ownership—without worrying much about what the transfer actually entails 
or the timing of when this might occur. 
The primary claim of this Article, however, is that the mechanics of 
back-end share transfer matter deeply to corporate law. Our current clearing 
systems limit shareholder rights in ways that most owners do not completely 
understand. Conversely, selling shareholders may evade responsibility for 
some corporate misdeeds because it has become too difficult to link 
individual sellers back to a specific share transfer. This has sometimes 
resulted in the imposition of corporate-level liability under a framework that 
is not entirely satisfactory because money is simply shifted from one pocket 
 
 1 See generally MICHAEL LEWIS, FLASH BOYS: A WALL STREET REVOLT (2014) (describing high-
frequency trading algorithm strategies and market structures); Charles R. Korsmo, High-Frequency 
Trading: A Regulatory Strategy, 48 U. RICH. L. REV. 523, 529–30 (2014) (evaluating legal approaches 
for mitigating systemic market risk in high-frequency trading). 
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(that of all current shareholders) to another (that of wronged shareholders).2 
Ex-shareholders, who may have benefitted from a transgression, are not 
tracked down or held accountable in any way.3 
The central player behind the scenes is the Depository Trust & Clearing 
Corporation (DTCC). Through numerous subsidiaries, DTCC takes physical 
possession of most stock certificates, serves as record owner for these shares, 
and clears trades by transferring beneficial ownership electronically from 
seller to buyer via bookkeeping adjustments.4 As we will see, this approach 
has played a crucial role in managing an exploding volume of stock trades 
over the past five decades by avoiding a need to coordinate the handoff of 
physical certificates from seller to buyer.5 
Problems arise, however, because DTCC’s warehouses of certificates 
are typically held in unidentifiable “fungible bulk.”6 This means that it is 
often impossible to specify who owns any given share of stock. We do not 
say that Bryce Buyer is the beneficial owner of stock certificate #123456789; 
rather, Bryce owns one share from a large pool of certificates isolated and 
housed by DTCC. Similarly, when Bryce sells the stock a month later, DTCC 
does not link that specific share to one of the thousands purchased by other 
buyers that same day. Said differently, we do not trace shares. 
In many cases, this does not matter. The fiscal trade has still occurred 
at a clearly defined moment and price. And beneficial shareholders, the true 
economic owners of the stock, can exercise most governance rights by asking 
their brokers to send corporate proxy materials and instructing these same 
brokers how to vote their shares.7 
But this lack of share identification has meaningful implications for 
corporate law. Shareholders must sometimes argue that they bought shares 
 
 2 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Causation by Presumption? Why the Supreme Court Should Reject 
Phantom Losses and Reverse Broudo, 60 BUS. LAW. 533, 541 (2005); Christine Hurt, The 
Undercivilization of Corporate Law, 33 J. CORP. L. 361, 441–42 (2008). The attorneys bringing the suit 
will, of course, also take a share of any recovery, usually as part of any settlement agreement. 
 3 See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 2, at 541–42 (“[S]ecurities litigation in this context inherently results 
in a wealth transfer between two classes of public shareholders, neither of whom is necessarily 
culpable. . . . [T]he beneficiaries of the fraud are . . . the selling shareholders—and they escape without 
incurring any cost when liability is later imposed on their former corporation.”). 
 4 See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, The Hanging Chads of Corporate Voting, 96 GEO. L.J. 1227, 
1238–40 (2008) (describing standard custodial practices). My description here is a slight simplification, 
as there may be several layers of custodians between the DTCC and the economic owner. See infra 
Section I.A. 
 5 See infra Section I.A. 
 6 Kahan & Rock, supra note 4, at 1239. 
 7 To be sure, mistakes will sometimes occur in a way that prejudices a shareholder’s rights. See infra 
notes 82–89. 
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that qualify for certain legal rights—such as an appraisal claim8 or a 
Securities Act Section 11 lawsuit9—when resolution of this eligibility is 
indeterminate. Delays arise between a change in economic ownership and 
the transfer of the right to vote, which means that current shareholders may 
not always possess franchise rights for important matters of corporate 
governance.10 And the imposition of corporate damages for certain legal 
wrongs, such as fraud on the market,11 has been criticized for effectively 
requiring “innocent” shareholders—who purchase the stock after a 
misrepresentation occurs—to compensate plaintiffs.12 Untraceable selling 
shareholders, who may have benefitted economically from the fraudulent 
misrepresentation, evade any loss. Might it be better to trace back the shares 
to those who owned the firm at the time of a misdeed and allow the injured 
shareholders to seek restitution from a previous investor? To date, these 
questions have remained academic because it has not been possible to make 
this sort of match. 
We are at a pivotal moment for corporate law, however, because back-
office technology is nearing a state where clearing systems can trace shares.13 
Prevailing stock settlement processes are likely to experience a fundamental 
transformation in the coming years with the rise of distributed ledger 
 
 8 Appraisal rights permit shareholders to sue, under certain circumstances, to obtain a judicially 
determined fair value for their shares, subject to procedural prerequisites. In Delaware, for instance, 
shareholders must perfect this right by demonstrating that their shares did not vote in favor of the 
transaction that triggered appraisal rights (often a merger). Many prospective plaintiffs, especially those 
who purchase shares after a voting record date, may be unable to determine whether “their shares” voted 
for or against the deal. See infra Section I.C.1.b. 
 9 Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 imposes liability for material misrepresentations in 
registration statements. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2012). Initial purchasers of the stock issued under the 
registration statement have clear Section 11 claims, but downstream buyers may have difficulty gaining 
standing for these claims. Many courts have permitted subsequent purchasers to pursue Section 11 claims 
only if the shareholders can definitively trace their shares back to the securities issued in connection with 
the problematic registration statement. As we will see, this is not an easy task, and courts deny some 
claims even when there is a high likelihood (though not quite 100% certainty) that a plaintiff’s shares 
came from the “tainted” issuance pool. See infra Section I.C.1.a. 
 10 Related concerns, such as “empty voting,” are also facilitated by an inability to specifically identify 
which shares belong to whom. See infra Section I.C.2. “Empty voting” typically refers to situations where 
an individual who does not have an economic interest in the outcome of the election exercises voting 
rights. See, e.g., Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, Hedge Funds, Insiders, and the Decoupling of 
Economic and Voting Ownership: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 13 J. CORP. FIN. 
343, 343 (2007) [hereinafter Hu & Black, Hedge Funds]; Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New 
Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811, 815 (2006) 
[hereinafter Hu & Black, New Vote Buying]. 
 11 Fraud on the market allows shareholders to sue for corporate misrepresentations in connection 
with a security trade, even when the investor did not hear of the misleading statement directly. See infra 
Section III.D. 
 12 See Coffee, supra note 2, at 543. 
 13 See infra Part II. 
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technology and new methods for identifying the origin and provenance of 
shares. This development would present new opportunities for reforming 
corporate governance and for rethinking foundational theories of corporate 
and shareholder liability. To be sure, such a change remains contingent, and 
new back-office paradigms are not inevitable. But revised settlement 
practices seem quite promising,14 and the era of unidentified fungible bulk 
may be drawing to a close. 
If this transition does occur, the legal implications of traceable shares 
will be profound. Buyers and sellers could specifically identify stock in a 
way that allows them to know whether marketed shares would qualify for 
certain legal claims. Corporate voting processes could be streamlined to 
mitigate, though not eliminate, voting pathologies. Faster transfer of 
traceable shares might dramatically eliminate delays between share 
exchange and the exercise of franchise rights to make corporate governance 
more responsive to shareholder interests. In light of the information that 
traceable shares could offer, we may even need to reexamine fundamental 
principles of shareholder responsibility for corporate misdeeds. 
This Article considers how the adoption of traceable shares would 
impact corporate law. Part I describes our current system for clearing stock 
trades and demonstrates how the failure to specifically identify shares creates 
legal problems. Part II surveys recent technological developments and argues 
that it may soon be possible to reform clearing systems in a way that replaces 
unidentified fungible bulk with traceable shares. Part III considers what this 
will mean for several key features of corporate law and offers normative 
suggestions for responding to these developments. A brief conclusion 
summarizes the Article. 
I. UNIDENTIFIED FUNGIBLE BULK 
Our mental model of corporate law envisions a stable body of 
shareholders who receive statements outlining the key issues on a 
forthcoming ballot, muster the information necessary to make sound 
decisions, and eventually cast their votes by proxy or at a shareholder 
meeting. In actuality, however, we do not live in such a stable world. 
There are at least two fundamental and related features of our current 
system for clearing stock trades that explain this break between our 
perception and reality: ownership specification and the timing of rights 
transfers. Settlement and clearing procedures for stock trades have become 
complex—to the point where it is often impossible to specify who owns any 
given share of stock. And after the shares trade, delays can still persist 
 
 14 See infra notes 135–39 and accompanying text. 
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between a change in economic ownership and the transfer of some legal 
rights, including the right to vote. Taken together, these developments have 
led to intractable difficulties in corporate law. But first, consider some brief 
history. 
A. A Brief History of Stock Settlement and Clearing Practices 
In the early and mid-1900s, when corporate law lingered in a formative 
state, investors lived in a paper world. Numbered stock certificates were 
stashed in private file cabinets, or perhaps broker storerooms, and passed 
from seller to buyer like the deed to a house or title to a car.15 But a share of 
stock can trade hands much more frequently than a used automobile, and by 
the 1960s the system was snowed under.16 There was simply too much 
trading volume. During the height of this paperwork crisis, traders closed the 
stock markets every Wednesday just so the brokers could inspect the unruly 
piles of certificates for authenticity, organize them for distribution, and route 
them to their new owners.17 Many brokers could not keep up and closed their 
doors.18 The United States Attorney General, in a 1971 Senate hearing, 
estimated that organized criminals had taken advantage of the chaos to steal 
more than $400 million in securities.19 
This paperwork crisis would not do, and eventually Congress directed 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to clear the logjam.20 The 
agency, working with Wall Street brokers, settled on a fix: share 
immobilization.21 A central entity emerged to replace the network of 
 
 15 See Kahan & Rock, supra note 4, at 1237; Wyatt Wells, Certificates and Computers: The 
Remaking of Wall Street, 1967 to 1971, 74 BUS. HIST. REV. 193, 201 (2000). 
 16 Wells, supra note 15, at 201. Two other requirements exacerbated the problem: (1) sellers had to 
notarize their certificates and (2) buyers had to present this evidence of sale to a firm’s transfer agent to 
become the new owner of record. Moreover, certificates designating more than 100 shares were 
uncommon, meaning that large purchases would often require numerous certificates to be processed. Id. 
 17 See WILLIAM T. DENTZER, JR., THE DEPOSITORY TRUST COMPANY: DTC’S FORMATIVE YEARS 
AND CREATION OF THE DEPOSITORY TRUST & CLEARING CORPORATION (DTCC) 1–2 (2008);  
FINRA Staff, When Paper Paralyzed Wall Street: Remembering the 1960s Paperwork Crisis, FINRA 
(Aug. 19, 2015), https://www.finra.org/investors/when-paper-paralyzed-wall-street-remembering-1960s-
paperwork-crisis [https://perma.cc/EL2Y-NPBB] (describing the Wednesday closures and broker failures 
due to the paperwork confusion); History of New York Stock Exchange Holidays, NYSE.COM (Jan. 
2011), http://s3.amazonaws.com/armstrongeconomics-wp/2013/07/NYSE-Closings.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7DLP-E54K] (describing periodic closings due to “back office work load” and 
Wednesday closings from June to December of 1968). 
 18 See Wells, supra note 15, at 193 (estimating that about one-sixth of brokerage firms went out of 
business during this period). 
 19 See Marjorie Hunter, Big Board Too Busy to Stop 1968–69 Thefts: Haack Tells Senate of ‘Near 
Crisis’ in Heavy Trading, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 1971, at 53. 
 20 In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., No. 9322-VCL, 2015 WL 4313206, at *1 (Del. Ch. July 30, 2015) 
(describing the pressure from Congress); Wells, supra note 15, at 208–09 (describing the role of the SEC). 
 21 See, e.g., Dell, 2015 WL 4313206, at *1–2. 
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messengers scurrying across the back alleys of New York. Over time, this 
organization, now known as the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation 
(DTCC),22 began to serve as the permanent record owner for a majority of 
shares.23 Secure DTCC warehouses hold certificates, physical or virtual, and 
the ownership name on each share no longer changes with every sale.24 
Similarly, a corporation will not adjust its official stockholder lists to reflect 
routine trades; the same record holder persists as the formal owner of the 
stock. Rather, the clearinghouse transfers beneficial ownership electronically 
from seller to buyer via bookkeeping adjustments.25 
Individual investors do not maintain accounts with DTCC, so another 
layer of intermediaries is needed to make this system work. Banks and 
brokerage firms serve this role, acting as custodians between DTCC and the 
principal investors.26 While they both play similar bridging roles, banks and 
brokerage firms typically serve different types of clients and may have 
somewhat different business models. 
Bank custodians work primarily with large institutional investors, such 
as university endowments, insurance companies, and mutual funds.27 Each 
bank keeps a direct account with DTCC, but DTCC does not concern itself 
with how shares are allocated among the bank’s various clients. For example, 
DTCC might record and track the total number of shares owned through The 
Bank of New York Mellon, State Street, JP Morgan Chase, and Citigroup 
(four behemoths of custodial banking), along with dozens of other smaller 
custodian banks. But DTCC keeps no information about how the 70 million 
shares of, say, Starbucks stock that are held in custody by JP Morgan Chase 
should be allocated between the New York Life Insurance Company, the 
Harvard endowment, T. Rowe Price, and numerous other institutional 
investors that might trade through JP Morgan Chase. The banks will maintain 
these records, of course, and they will work with their clients to determine 
how to disseminate important information and how to exercise governance 
rights, such as the right to vote. In some cases, the largest custodian banks 
 
 22 The DTCC actually provides a broader range of settlement and clearing activities; most stock 
transfers are handled by subsidiaries: the Depository Trust Company (DTC) and Cede & Company 
(Cede). See The Depository Trust Company (DTC), DTCC, http://www.dtcc.com/about/ 
businesses-and-subsidiaries/dtc.aspx [https://perma.cc/4Y84-B52M]. 
 23 For public firms, as much as 70%–80% of shares are estimated to be held through the DTCC and 
other nominees. See Larry T. Garvin, The Changed (and Changing?) Uniform Commercial Code, 26 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 285, 315 (1999). 
 24 See Kahan & Rock, supra note 4, at 1238–40. 
 25 Id. at 1239. 
 26 Id. at 1238–40. 
 27 Id. at 1238. 
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will also perform these same services for smaller custodian banks—meaning 
that there can be several nested layers of intermediation.28 
What happens if Harvard decides to sell its stake in Starbucks? The 
endowment manager notifies its custodian bank, who may then help execute 
the trade.29 The custodian bank will usually benchmark the economic effect 
of the sale immediately, but it will take longer to work everything through 
the back-end plumbing of clearing and settlement.30 If another client of the 
custodian bank happens to take the other side of the trade, then DTCC, in 
theory, need not even be aware of the exchange. The bank might just adjust 
its records to show that Harvard no longer owns the stock and that a different 
client is now beneficial owner. Offsetting adjustments are also required, of 
course, to account for the transfer of cash from buyer to seller.31 In many 
cases, however, the buyer (or buyers, if the shares are sold in multiple blocks) 
and the seller will be represented by different brokers or bank custodians. If 
so, DTCC will need to record a bookkeeping adjustment to reduce the shares 
allocated to Harvard’s bank custodian and increase the shares allocated to 
these other custodians.32 Note, however, that DTCC persists as record holder 
of the shares throughout this process and that no specific shares are identified 
as “the ones” being traded. Starbucks might not even realize that a large trade 
has occurred. 
Brokerage firms, in contrast to custodian banks, tend to work with 
hedge funds, smaller retail customers, and individual investors.33 Brokers 
may offer some different services, but their clearing process does not differ 
in a meaningful way from that of custodian banks. A brokerage firm 
maintains an account with the DTCC, processes stock trades on a client’s 
behalf, preserves records of the shares bought and sold by clients, and works 
 
 28 Id. at 1239. 
 29 In addition to facilitating trading markets, banks typically perform a variety of additional services 
for clients, including settlement and asset safekeeping. Many banks also have a robust securities-lending 
business, where stock is loaned to outside parties (for a variety of purposes, inducing short-selling 
transactions) and the resulting fees are shared between the custodian bank and the client whose shares are 
loaned out. Id. 
 30 Standards have converged recently on a settlement norm of T+2, meaning that everything should 
be settled and cleared by an average of two days after the trade. There is a push to shorten this time to 
T+1. Synchronous clearing might be described as the holy grail of exchange. See Pete Chandler, T+2 Is 
Here, FINRA (Sept. 7, 2017), http://www.finra.org/investors/highlights/t-plus-two-is-here [https:// 
perma.cc/X8D5-9EXC]. 
 31 For example, if the buyer and seller of the stock both trade with the same custodian, then the bank 
might increase the seller’s cash account and decrease the buyer’s cash account. If the buyer and seller use 
different custodians, then the custodian for the seller will increase the seller’s cash account and the 
custodian for the buyer will decrease the buyer’s cash account. 
 32 This is a slight simplification due to the possibility of netting. See infra note 188 and accompanying 
text. 
 33 See Kahan & Rock, supra note 4, at 1240. 
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with the DTCC to adjust the broker’s own DTCC account to reflect top-level 
changes in the number of shares held by clients.34 Again, however, the shares 
remain isolated in unidentified fungible bulk. 
The creation of the DTCC and the elimination of physical certificate 
transfer have, on the whole, been a welcome development. Indeed, it is 
impossible to imagine how the old system could support the roughly 5 
million trades that occur each day on the New York Stock Exchange.35 But 
the use of intermediate agents greatly complicates the mechanisms that must 
now be used to convey the vote and other important legal rights to beneficial 
shareholders. 
B. Ownership and Voting Rights 
Corporate law did not respond to the rise of fungible bulk shareholding 
by altering its doctrines to provide direct legal rights to beneficial owners. In 
Delaware, for instance, the record holder persists as registered owner of the 
stock on a corporation’s books and retains the formal right to cast votes.36 
Any downstream custodial relationship between banks, brokers, and clients 
is treated as a matter of agency and not a primary concern for Delaware 
corporate law.37 If mistakes arise from misunderstandings between beneficial 
owners and their brokers, then it is up to the private parties to sort out the 
problems; Delaware courts will not step in to make things right through 
equitable adjustments.38 This is not because Delaware lawmakers are 
unaware of the DTCC framework, of course, but rather because they have 
elected to prioritize the certainty provided by a firm’s absolute reliance on 
its formal list of record stockholders.39 
For many corporations, this means that a DTCC subsidiary named Cede 
& Company is listed as the record holder for a vast majority of stock. Yet 
Cede does not make substantive decisions about how to cast votes to elect 
directors or approve merger transactions. Rather, a complex series of events 
will typically occur to shift voting rights to the distributed beneficial 
 
 34 Id. at 1239–40. 
 35 For recent data about daily trading volumes on the NYSE, see NYSE Group Volume in All Stocks 
Traded: 2010–Current, NYXDATA.COM, http://www.nyxdata.com/nysedata/asp/factbook/viewer_ 
edition.asp?mode=table&key=3320&category=3 [https://perma.cc/3TTC-M7PV]. 
 36 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212 (West 2006) (describing who gets to vote); id. § 262(a) 
(noting that in the appraisal context “the word ‘stockholder’ means a holder of record of stock in a 
corporation”). 
 37 See In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., No. 9322-VCL, 2015 WL 4313206, at *6–7 (Del. Ch. July 30, 
2015) (describing the evolution of Delaware’s formal treatment of shareholders). 
 38 Id. at *10–11. 
 39 Id. at *17–18. 
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shareholders who should actually have the legal and economic right to weigh 
in on matters of corporate governance. 
Professors Marcel Kahan and Edward Rock have described this process 
and its flaws in a seminal article on corporate voting,40 so I will only 
summarize the key steps here. A firm preparing for an upcoming vote will 
contact DTCC to obtain the list of banks and brokers who hold shares as 
custodians for beneficial owners. The firm will then ask each of these 
custodians to provide the next level of information about who actually owns 
the stock, so that the corporation can prepare proxy materials related to the 
vote.41 This can take some time because there may be several layers of 
custodial ownership and the banks will need to obtain data from the very 
bottom level.42 The firm will then provide each custodian with copies of the 
proxy materials for distribution to beneficial owners.43 
How are votes actually cast if Cede retains the formal right, as record 
holder, to the franchise? Cede will execute a global proxy that allows its 
account holders, the custodian banks and brokers, to cast Cede’s votes in 
proportion to their total allocation.44 If JP Morgan Chase reports clients with 
25% of the shares, for example, then Cede will send that bank a proxy 
allowing it to cast a quarter of the firm’s votes. The custodians may then do 
the same thing for individual clients (moving down through the layers as 
necessary) and fragment these proxy rights even further. Granted this proxy, 
the beneficial holders can then cast their votes as they wish. Alternatively, 
the banks and brokers might just ask beneficial shareholders to supply them 
with timely voting instructions rather than execute a second proxy.45 Many 
custodians seem to opt for the latter approach, aggregating the instructions 
 
 40 Kahan & Rock, supra note 4, at 1243–48. 
 41 For annual elections, this will typically include an annual report describing the firm’s recent 
performance, a proxy statement describing the key issues on the ballot, and instructions or materials (such 
as proxy card) for the actual casting of votes. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW § 10.3, at 
246–47 (2d ed. 2009). 
 42 One sign of the imprecision raised by this framework is that the total number of shares reported 
up through the banks may not always match the corporation’s records for the total number of shares issued 
and outstanding. Any discrepancies may remain unreconciled at this point in the process. See Kahan & 
Rock, supra note 4, at 1243–44. 
 43 Most of these communication efforts with shareholders are outsourced to third-party specialists. 
Moreover, the SEC adopted “e-proxy” or “notice and access” rules in 2007 to allow firms to use e-mail 
and the internet for delivering these materials to willing shareholders. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-16 (2018). 
 44 Kahan & Rock, supra note 4, at 1247. 
 45 Id. The exact requirements are codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.14b-2(b). 
113:227 (2018) Traceable Shares 
237 
and then casting these votes with the firm.46 As the votes arrive, the firm can 
then verify proxies, tabulate votes, and report the final results.47 
This is not an instantaneous process, and the need to gather and transmit 
information back and forth between multiple parties presents a fundamental 
timing concern: how to assign and freeze voting rights in an ever-churning 
river of stock trades. Large companies have vast trading volumes.48 In the 
time that it takes to send information and collect responses, the pool of 
beneficial owners can change significantly, and the process would need to 
begin anew. How can we ever pause events long enough to locate the current 
beneficial owners, send the ballot, deliberate, and cast votes through the 
distributed mechanisms that are required in a regime of untraceable shares? 
Corporate law finesses this problem by establishing a bright-line 
“record date” when franchise rights attach to current owners—even if these 
owners choose to sell their shares before the date of the actual vote.49 This 
gives the firm time to distribute information and process the votes, though it 
weakens the incentives to participate for some shareholders who no longer 
own the shares and may not care about the voting matter. Starbucks, for 
instance, might designate a record date thirty days before its annual 
shareholder meeting. If so, an investor who buys stock after this T-30 date 
cannot normally vote the late-purchased stock.50 Corporate law takes the 
same “snapshot” approach with dividends.51 Shareholders on the record date 
will eventually receive the payments, and the shares trade “ex dividend,” 
 
 46 Id. 
 47 Again, it is common for firms to outsource the actual processing and tabulation of votes to a third-
party provider. For contested matters, such as director election contests, an independent inspector may 
also be retained to supervise the entire process. See, e.g., In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., 143 A.3d 20, 32 
(Del. Ch. 2016). 
 48 On the very busiest days, for example, over 50 million shares of Apple stock are traded. See Apple 
Inc. Common Stock Historical Stock Prices, NASDAQ (June 11, 2018), 
http://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/aapl/historical. 
 49 Delaware General Corporate Law is illustrative. Under § 213, a record date “not [] more than 60 
nor less than 10 days before the date of such meeting” establishes the roster of eligible voters. DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 8, § 213(a) (West 2006). 
 50 The selling shareholder will retain voting rights, in this example, and it is possible for the buying 
shareholder to make special arrangements with the selling shareholder to obtain a voting proxy that allows 
the later shareholder to cast the votes. This is generally understood to be uncommon. See, e.g., George S. 
Geis, An Appraisal Puzzle, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1635, 1652 n.113 (2011). 
 51 More specifically, a firm will process dividends through a series of chronological steps. First, the 
board will approve an upcoming dividend. Second, the firm will announce the dividend and state that it 
will be paid to all shareholders who hold the stock on a given future date (the record date). Shares will 
begin to trade without dividend rights (“ex dividend”) a couple of days before the record date. Typically, 
the share price will drop on this date by the amount of the forthcoming dividend. Finally, the firm will 
distribute the dividend to all entitled shareholders, typically a week or so after the record date. For a more 
detailed discussion of this process, see RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE 
FINANCE § 16.2, at 392–93 (10th ed. 2011). 
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long before any checks are cut.52 This system seems to work fine for 
economic matters; share prices simply drop on the record date to reflect the 
severance of a forthcoming dividend payment from the stock. But delays 
between the vesting of voting rights on the record date and the time of the 
actual vote at the shareholder meeting—along with the lack of precision 
introduced by unidentified fungible bulk—can create more serious concerns. 
Which brings us to the final question of this Part—What’s wrong with 
untraceable shares? 
C. What’s Wrong with Untraceable Shares? 
Untraceable shares present varying and consequential problems in 
corporate law. Among other things, the inability to specifically identify the 
owner of a share can affect a beneficial owner’s legal rights, foster 
illegitimate voting, and hinder efforts at corporate governance reform. 
1. Legal Rights Requiring Share Identification 
Many legal rights—such as the ability to collect dividends, sell shares, 
or file a shareholder derivative lawsuit—do not require share identification. 
It may be important to establish that you own some shares of a corporation 
to take these actions, but it does not matter which shares you own. Any 
certificate will do. On the other hand, some legal rights do invoke share 
identification requirements, and these situations can lead to intractable 
problems in a world of fungible bulk. 
a. Section 11 claims 
The most clear-cut example of the identification problem involves 
lawsuits filed under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 (the “Securities 
Act”).53 Section 11 imposes liability when shares are sold pursuant to a 
registration statement that contains materially misleading statements or 
omissions.54 Its purpose is to ensure the accuracy and integrity of registration 
filings, often by imposing hefty sanctions for misdeeds.55 The issuing firm is 
held strictly liable under Section 11, while a cluster of other possible 
 
 52 Id. 
 53 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2012). 
 54 Id. § 77k(a). 
 55 See, e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest, Morrison, the Restricted Scope of Securities Act Section 11 
Liability, and Prospects for Regulatory Reform, 41 J. CORP. L. 1, 3 (2015) (“Section 11 liability is the 
source of many of the largest class action securities recoveries in history, and . . . can serve as the most 
plaintiff-friendly provision of the federal securities laws.” (footnote omitted)). In part, this is true because 
plaintiffs do not need to establish scienter or intent on the part of the defendants. See In re Morgan Stanley 
Info. Fund Sec. Litig., 592 F.3d 347, 359 (2d Cir. 2010) (discussing the mental state required for liability). 
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defendants—including directors, accountants, and underwriters—can also 
be held liable under various negligence standards.56 
Section 11 lawsuits can grow complicated, however, when it becomes 
necessary to determine which shareholders may assert a claim or join a class 
action lawsuit. The language of the statute most clearly protects initial 
purchasers who might be expected to rely on the registration statement, either 
explicitly or constructively, when buying stock directly from the issuing 
firm.57 These buyers have clear standing to bring a Section 11 claim when 
something goes awry.58 
Jurisdictions are split, however, on whether secondary market 
purchasers, who transact after the initial issuance, can bring or join claims 
under Section 11,59 and the U.S. Supreme Court has not weighed in on the 
topic. Early appellate decisions rejected the position that all subsequent 
secondary market buyers had standing.60 A few courts still insist that 
downstream buyers may never assert a Section 11 claim,61 but this is a 
minority view.62 The more common approach is to allow secondary market 
claims if plaintiffs can “trace” their stock back to the specific shares that 
 
 56 The precise test for liability depends on the nature of the misrepresentation and the identity of the 
defendant. See, e.g., THOMAS LEE HAZEN, 2 TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 7:4 
(7th ed., 2016 rev. vol.) (analyzing the various standards of liability). Many defendants (though not the 
issuer) will also possess a due diligence defense to liability. See Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. 
Supp. 643, 682–703 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (assessing liability standards and the availability of a due diligence 
defense for various types of defendants); William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The Due Diligence Defense Under 
Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 44 BRANDEIS L.J. 549, 549–50 (2006). 
 57 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (“In case any part of the registration statement . . . contained an untrue 
statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to 
make the statements therein not misleading, any person acquiring such security (unless it is proved that 
at the time of such acquisition he knew of such untruth or omission) may, either at law or in equity, in 
any court of competent jurisdiction, sue [for damages].”). 
 58 See Grundfest, supra note 55, at 5. 
 59 See In re Summit Med. Sys., Inc., Sec. Litig., 10 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1070 (D. Minn. 1998) (“Courts 
are split as to the definition of potential plaintiffs who may bring claims under Section 11.”); Grundfest, 
supra note 55, at 5, 41–42, 41 n.237 (describing the split, including an apparent internal conflict within 
the Third Circuit). 
 60 See, e.g., Barnes v. Osofsky, 373 F.2d 269, 271–73 (2d Cir. 1967) (“[A]n action under § 11 may 
be maintained only by one who comes within a narrow class of persons, i.e. those who purchase securities 
that are the direct subject of the prospectus and registration statement.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 61 See Shapiro v. UJB Fin. Corp., 964 F.2d 272, 286 (3d Cir. 1992) (“If plaintiffs’ shares were 
purchased in the secondary market, they would not be linked to a registration statement filed during the 
class period, and the § 11 claim would fail.”); Summit, 10 F. Supp. 2d at 1070 (“Section 11 is applicable 
only to shareholders who acquired their stock in the IPO.”); In re WRT Energy Sec. Litig., No. 96 CIV. 
3610, 1997 WL 576023, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 1997) (holding that plaintiffs lacked standing for a 
Section 11 claim because they did not allege that they purchased the securities in the initial issuance). 
 62 See Grundfest, supra note 55, at 41–42, 41 n.237. Numerous federal circuit courts, including the 
Second, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth, do not impose an original purchaser requirement. Id. 
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were issued in connection with the tainted registration statement.63 The logic 
seems to be that if the shares can be linked to the offending registration filing, 
then a Section 11 claim should not be severed, under the plain language of 
the statute, simply because there has been a transfer of ownership.64 For 
example, if the only source of shares on a secondary market comes from a 
single public offering, then downstream buyers can trace their shares to this 
primary issuance and bring a Section 11 claim in most jurisdictions. There is 
no other way they could have obtained the shares. But it is not always so 
easy to demonstrate such pristine provenance.65 
What happens if a court cannot be 100 percent certain that a given 
plaintiff’s shares were sold via the tainted registration statement? In Krim v. 
pcOrder.com, for example, several plaintiffs filed a Section 11 claim 
alleging that pcOrder had conducted an initial public offering with a 
fraudulent registration statement.66 For a few months after this offering, no 
other shares were available for trading on the secondary markets. Eventually, 
however, some shares that had not been part of the public offering (owned 
by insiders at the firm) began to trickle out into the market.67 Most of 
pcOrder’s stock was isolated in fungible bulk by the DTCC, with Cede listed 
as the formal record owner.68 
Consider the fate of three different plaintiffs in the case. Plaintiff A 
bought 1000 shares on the secondary market soon after the IPO—when the 
 
 63 See, e.g., In re Global Crossing, Ltd. Sec. Litig., 313 F. Supp. 2d 189, 206 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 
(rejecting the defendant’s claim “that only those who purchased stock in the initial offering, and not 
aftermarket purchasers, are entitled to sue under section 11”). 
 64 Section 11 confers standing on “any person acquiring such security (unless it is proved that at the 
time of such acquisition he knew of such untruth or omission).” 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2012). It does not 
state that the acquisition must have been an initial acquisition from the issuer. See Krim v. pcOrder.com, 
Inc., 402 F.3d 489, 495 (5th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he plain language of [Section 11 suggests] there is no reason 
to categorically exclude aftermarket purchasers, ‘so long as the security was indeed issued under that 
registration statement and not another.’” (quoting DeMaria v. Andersen, 318 F.3d 170, 176 (2d Cir. 
2003))). One might also assert a policy justification for permitting these secondary market claims to 
provide additional deterrence against fraudulent registration statements that evade liability through the 
rapid share turnover that often accompanies public offerings. See, e.g., Hillary A. Sale, Disappearing 
Without a Trace: Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the 1933 Securities Act, 75 WASH. L. REV. 429, 462–73 
(2000); Marc I. Steinberg & Brent A. Kirby, The Assault on Section 11 of the Securities Act: A Study in 
Judicial Activism, 63 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 31–36 (2010). 
 65 See Sale, supra note 64, at 441–62 (examining the common law development of Section 11’s 
tracing doctrine, describing various tracing methods, and reiterating concerns about the mismatch 
between a tracing requirement and the use of fungible bulk clearing and settlement methods). 
 66 402 F.3d at 491–92. There were actually two public issuances: an IPO on February 26, 1999 (under 
which most of the shares were issued) and a secondary public offering on December 7, 1999 (under which 
fewer shares were issued). The plaintiffs alleged defects in both registration statements, and the use of 
two issuances, is not critical to the disposition of the case. Id. 
 67 Id. at 492. 
 68 Id. 
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only shares available for purchase were those released in the IPO. 
Accordingly, plaintiff A could successfully trace his shares, as a matter of 
simple logic, and gain standing for a Section 11 claim.69 By contrast, plaintiff 
C bought shares at a later date when some of the insider shares had leaked 
into the market. The Fifth Circuit ruled that this plaintiff was unable to 
definitively trace his shares back to the offering, because almost 10% of the 
pool of available shares at the moment of purchase were not issued in 
connection with the registration statement.70 As we have seen, specific shares 
are not typically identified with a transfer, so plaintiff C was unable to pierce 
the fog of DTCC’s fungible bulk holdings. Even plaintiff B—who bought 
stock after plaintiff A but before plaintiff C, from a pool where 99.85% of 
the total shares available could be attributed to the IPO71—was blocked from 
joining the case.72 The probability that plaintiff B bought at least 1 of his 
3,000 shares from those issued via the public offering was incredibly close 
to 100%,73 but the court insisted on absolute certainty.74 
As Krim suggests, Section 11 cases frequently need to evaluate 
alternative methodologies for determining whether a plaintiff has established 
a sufficient link to specific shares. One notable opinion, Kirkwood v. 
 
 69 Id. Plaintiff A is Beebe in the actual case. 
 70 Id. at 492–93. Plaintiff C is Petrick in the actual case. 
 71 Id. at 492. Plaintiff B (who is Burke in the actual case) bought his shares earlier than plaintiff C, 
and the insider shares had only just started to trickle into the public markets at the time of plaintiff B’s 
purchase. Id. 
 72 Id. at 492–93 (describing the district court’s finding that plaintiff B lacked standing). The Fifth 
Circuit affirmed. Id. at 494. 
 73 The plaintiff’s expert witness opined that the chance that plaintiff B obtained at least one share 





999999999999999999999999999999%. Id. at 492 n.6. 
 74 Id. at 496–97. The court reached this result though an interesting line of reasoning: 
The fallacy of [the plaintiff’s] position is demonstrated with the following analogy. Taking a 
United States resident at random, there is a 99.83% chance that she will be from somewhere other 
than Wyoming. Does this high statistical likelihood alone, assuming for whatever reason there is 
no other information available, mean that she can avail herself of diversity jurisdiction in a suit 
against a Wyoming resident? Surely not. 
Id. at 497. The analogy neglects the different practical concerns between demonstrating one’s citizenship 
and demonstrating the precise origin of shares held in fungible bulk. With the residency question, 
additional information is available; with share origin, it may not be ascertainable. Other courts have 
concurred with Krim’s rejection of statistical tracing methods. See, e.g., Grand Lodge of Pa. v. Peters, 
550 F. Supp. 2d 1363, 1374 (M.D. Fla. 2008) (rejecting tracing based on “statistical likelihoods” that 
shares can be traced to a faulty registration statement); In re Alamosa Holdings, Inc. Sec. Litig., 382 F. 
Supp. 2d 832, 864 (N.D. Tex. 2005) (concluding that the “mere probability that a plaintiff can trace shares 
is clearly insufficient” to establish standing). 
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Taylor,75 considered four different ways of implementing a tracing 
requirement. First, the direct tracing method occurs when a plaintiff can 
demonstrate that she purchased the stock directly in an underwritten public 
offering.76 This method obviously offers no help for secondary market 
claimants. 
A second possible method, fungible mass tracing, posits that a plaintiff 
shareholder maintains a proportional interest in the number of tainted shares 
in the pool held in fungible bulk by DTCC.77 For example, suppose DTCC 
holds 500 shares of a firm in fungible bulk, and 500 more shares are added 
under a fraudulent registration statement. A secondary market purchaser 
could argue that half of her shares should qualify for a Section 11 claim under 
fungible mass tracing. This approach, however, was rejected by the 
Kirkwood court,78 and it has not caught on more generally.79 
A third possibility, the “contrabroker method,” occurs when a 
shareholder argues that she bought shares from a broker who, in turn, 
purchased the shares from another broker who was a market maker for the 
stock of the issuing firm.80 The Kirkwood court quickly rejected this method, 
however, because the plaintiff could not demonstrate that the stock sold by 
the market maker was from the tainted registration statement.81 In other 
words, the market maker could have been dealing in older or newer issuances 
of the firm’s stock.82 
Finally, Kirkwood considered a fourth alternative, which it called 
“heritage tracing.”83 Using this approach, a plaintiff traces back share 
certificates in a manner akin to genealogy research. In the words of the court: 
Plaintiffs contend that they purchased stock in the over-the-counter market and 
received stock certificates registered in their individual names. In the records of 
[the firm’s] stock transfer agent, plaintiffs identified by code number the 
certificates they had received. Then plaintiffs identified the particular 
 
 75 590 F. Supp. 1375 (D. Minn. 1984). As an aside, the defending firm was represented by an attorney 
named James O’Hagan at Dorsey & Whitney, who became infamous in corporate law circles a few years 
later for his highly specialized knowledge of certain trading markets. See United States v. O’Hagan, 
521 U.S. 642, 647–49 (1997). 
 76 590 F. Supp. at 1378. 
 77 See id. at 1378–79. 
 78 Id. at 1380. 
 79 See, e.g., Sale, supra note 64, at 448–51 (describing one court’s analysis and ultimate rejection of 
the fungible mass tracing method). 
 80 590 F. Supp. at 1381–82. Market maker, in this context, refers to brokers who stand ready to buy 
or sell the stock of a particular firm to help establish trading liquidity. 
 81 Id. at 1381. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. at 1382–83. 
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certificates from which their individual certificates were issued. The process 
was continued until plaintiffs determined the ultimate origin of their certificates. 
Some of those certificates were expressly issued in the [allegedly fraudulent] 
March 5, 1981 offering. Thus, plaintiffs maintain, they can trace their shares to 
the offering.84 
This method sounds more promising, but identifying the lineage of old 
stock certificates can be just as speculative as efforts to track down your 
ancestors. For instance, under the facts of the case, the plaintiff received 
three new share certificates: one that represented 1000 shares (MU038125), 
one that represented 500 shares (MU038126), and one that represented 500 
shares (MU038286).85 But these new certificates did not correspond on a 
one-for-one basis with other certificates that had been surrendered to the firm 
upon sale. Rather, four different certificates (MU033047, MU037214, 
MU037106, and MU037312) representing a total of about 9510 shares had 
been fed into the meat grinder in order to crank out two of the plaintiff’s new 
certificates, along with several others.86 The first three surrendered 
certificates could eventually be traced back to an offending registration 
statement, using this same method of heritage tracing, but the last 
surrendered certificate could not be linked back.87 Moreover, since the 
MU037312 certificate represented over 2020 shares, it was possible that all 
of the plaintiff’s shares came from this “untainted” batch.88 For this reason, 
Kirkwood found the inquiry indeterminate and rejected proof via heritage 
tracing in this context.89 
Still another approach might be to permit all secondary market 
purchasers who transact within a short time period after an offending 
registration statement to join a Section 11 claim. A few courts have gone this 
route, essentially abandoning the strict tracing requirement for a more 
 
 84 Id. at 1382. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. at 1382–83. It is possible, of course, that heritage tracing might demonstrate a clear link. For 
example, if the last certificate in Kirkwood had not been fed into the meat grinder to issue the new 
certificates, then all the plaintiff’s shares could have been definitively linked to the tainted registration 
statement. The real problem, however, is that the Kirkwood plaintiffs were only able to attempt heritage 
tracing because the new certificates had been issued in their personal names. See Sale, supra note 64, at 
452 n.153. As described earlier, this is not common for modern trading situations today; most shares are 
held in street name, and heritage tracing thus offers little assistance for any buyer purchasing as a 
beneficial holder. 
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workable rule.90 The problem, however, is that temporal claim allowance 
represents a significant departure from the statutory language of the 
Securities Act.91 It also poses a risk of overdeterrence in an era where the 
same share may be bought and sold by multiple parties repeatedly during the 
short period when claims are allowed. Perhaps for these reasons, courts 
rarely abandon the tracing test in favor of a temporal approach.92 
From the case law, it seems clear that impeccable share provenance is 
still the standard for Section 11 litigation, and statistical tracing is not current 
law. At the same time, definitively tracing shares back to a given issuance is 
exceedingly difficult—usually impossible—in a world of fungible bulk 
clearing. The upshot, then, is that most secondary market Section 11 claims 
are denied, even when it is highly likely that a plaintiff bought some shares 
from a “tainted” pool. This may or may not be problematic, depending upon 
one’s views about the optimal level of deterrence under the Securities Act.93 
Nonetheless, it does seem strange to establish a general principle that Section 
11 claims are available for secondary buyers and then adopt a follow-on rule 
that effectively guts those same claims in most contexts.94 
b. Appraisal rights 
Another illustration of the identification problem involves shareholder 
appraisal claims, an area of law that has recently seen a rise in legal activity.95 
 
 90 See, e.g., Wade v. Indus. Funding Corp., No. C 92-0343 TEH, 1993 WL 650837, at *5–6 (N.D. 
Cal. Aug. 30, 1993) (allowing purchasers who bought within the ninety-day period following a 
registration statement to maintain their claims). 
 91 Nothing in the text of Section 11 suggests that standing should be governed by temporal 
considerations. See supra note 64. 
 92 Cf. Sale, supra note 64, at 455 (describing how a handful of courts have used this method). 
 93 For a more general discussion of the merits and policy implications of Section 11 liability, see, for 
example, Grundfest, supra note 55, at 56–58; Allan Horwich, Section 11 of the Securities Act: The 
Cornerstone Needs Some Tuckpointing, 58 BUS. LAW. 1 (2002); and Steinberg & Kirby, supra note 64. 
 94 To further complicate matters, Professor Joseph Grundfest has argued that the international scope 
of initial stock offerings may throw an additional wrench into the machinery. See Grundfest, supra note 
55, at 48–56. It can be argued that the Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison v. National Australia Bank 
Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010), which restricted the extraterritorial reach of Section 10(b) of the Exchange 
Act, has limited the availability of Section 11 claims to shares that are sold into domestic U.S. markets. 
See Grundfest, supra note 55, at 48–49. In many situations, however, a firm may sell some of its initial 
shares through foreign brokers who would not be considered domestic under a Morrison analysis. 
Accordingly, it is possible that some shares sold in a public offering are rendered ineligible for a Section 
11 claim. This fact alone might make it impossible to trace back downstream shares to ones that originally 
qualified for legal standing. In a world of fungible bulk, a firm could conceivably evade all downstream 
Section 11 liability simply by including one small international buyer to stymie the absolute tracing 
requirements. See id. at 49. Of course, adopting a new clearing system that specifically traces shares 
would resolve this conundrum. 
 95 See, e.g., Charles R. Korsmo & Minor Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage and the Future of Public 
Company M&A, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1551, 1566–78 (2015) (tracking the incidence of appraisal claims 
in recent years). 
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Appraisal rights, in a nutshell, allow shareholders to sue for the fair value of 
their shares, as determined through judicial proceedings, when they object to 
a merger or related fundamental transaction.96 In Delaware, an owner may 
not seek appraisal rights if she votes her shares in favor of the merger. The 
tool is only available for dissenters.97 
If you are a beneficial owner who holds shares continuously from the 
time of a merger’s announcement through the shareholder vote and eventual 
consummation of the deal, then it should be easy to dissent and perfect your 
appraisal rights. When the voting instructions arrive from your broker, you 
can vote your shares against the triggering transaction. Or you might just 
abstain because nonvoting shares are also eligible for appraisal rights.98 
Assuming that all goes according to plan, your lawsuit can proceed. 
Given the complexity of this entire system, however, some missteps 
will inevitably occur. Consider a recent appraisal case involving Dell Inc.99 
During 2013, a group of shareholders objected to the price paid in a going-
private buyout of Dell by founder Michael Dell.100 One of the larger 
plaintiffs, T. Rowe Price, wished to instruct its bank custodian, State Street 
Bank & Trust, to vote its shares against the buyout in order to perfect an 
appraisal claim.101 Amazingly, evidence emerged that these shares were 
actually voted in favor of the deal by mistake.102 Dell quickly seized upon 
this fact to argue that T. Rowe Price’s stock had become ineligible for 
appraisal rights because of this mistake.103 
 
 96 See Robert B. Thompson, Exit, Liquidity, and Majority Rule: Appraisal’s Role in Corporate Law, 
84 GEO. L.J. 1, 3–4 (1995) (describing appraisal rights and tracing their function); Barry M. Wertheimer, 
The Shareholders’ Appraisal Remedy and How Courts Determine Fair Value, 47 DUKE L.J. 613, 618–26 
(1998) (discussing the history and development of appraisal rights). 
 97 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(a) (West 2006). 
 98 Id. Said differently, only shares that vote in favor of the disputed transaction are disqualified. 
 99 In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., 143 A.3d 20 (Del. Ch. 2016). 
 100 Id. at 21–23. 
 101 Id. at 26–27. 
 102 Id. at 27–36. The fact that these sophisticated parties could make a voting mistake may sound 
ridiculous, but it becomes more understandable when one considers that firms often outsource the actual 
tasks of voting and vote processing to third parties. In this case, record holder State Street hired a firm 
named Broadridge Financial Solutions (“Broadridge,” a large player in this area) to process client voting 
instructions. Id. at 29. T. Rowe Price also outsourced the execution of its voting preferences to 
Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS). Id. at 25–26. During the Dell vote, T. Rowe Price intended to 
vote against the merger and informed ISS of this decision. Id. at 26–27. ISS prepared to vote no. Id. at 
27. But when the shareholder meeting was rescheduled, a new database record was prepared and the 
voting instructions were reset. Id. at 27–28. T. Rowe Price had previously established a default voting 
instruction of “yes” with ISS, and a failure to override this default a second time (due to the rescheduled 
vote) led to the ultimate error. Id. 
 103 Id. at 36. 
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The Delaware Vice Chancellor surely recognized T. Rowe Price’s 
frustration, but he refused to allow the mutual fund to proceed with an 
appraisal claim for these shares.104 In many cases it may not be possible to 
track down evidence related to how specific shares were voted,105 but when 
the evidence is available,106 the court held that it should be considered.107 
Because the shares linked to T. Rowe Price’s position had clearly voted, 
albeit mistakenly, in favor of the merger, T. Rowe Price, the beneficial 
holder, lost its ability to pursue an appraisal claim.108 
The facts underlying this case are unusual, and we might expect that 
future claimants will be more careful about how their shares are voted. Yet 
the opinion also suggests that if specific shares can somehow be traced, then 
the court should use this evidence to determine the availability of appraisal 
rights.109 Accordingly, though this case might otherwise be insignificant 
because blatant voting mistakes are uncommon, it will take on much greater 
significance if the technology used to clear and settle trades changes to allow 
for traceable shares.110 
 
 104 Id. at 55–56. 
 105 See supra notes 92–100 and accompanying text. 
 106 The careful reader might wonder how Dell could prove that these shares had been voted in favor 
of the transaction in a world of fungible bulk. The ability to link the voting instructions of T. Rowe Price 
to a specific cluster of shares arose because Broadridge, the third party tasked with voting and vote 
processing, had assigned a unique internal control number to each transaction. A required filing with the 
SEC for mutual fund voting also provided additional evidence of the mistake. Dell Inc., 143 A.3d at 30–
36. 
 107 Id. at 52. 
 108 Id. at 59. Interestingly, this was not the only Dell appraisal case to limit a claimant’s appraisal 
rights due to a technical violation of the qualification rules. In yet another proceeding related to this same 
dispute, the court also held that some shareholders lost their appraisal rights when the formal record holder 
for their shares changed from Cede to another custodial bank nominee. See In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., 
No. 9322-VCL, 2015 WL 4313206, at *25 (Del. Ch. July 13, 2015). This event was triggered by a DTCC 
policy of releasing shares to the custodian banks when they learned that the record holders wished to 
dissent from a deal. Id. at *3. The banks, in turn, had a policy of formally retitling the shares in the names 
of their own nominees under internal policies. Id. Taken together, the court ruled that the continuous 
holding requirement of Section 262 had not been met and that plaintiffs lost their ability to seek appraisal 
for these shares. As a matter of formal logic, this makes sense; as a practical matter, however, it is crazy. 
The Vice Chancellor expressed consternation with this outcome—he spent half of his opinion advocating 
for reforms that would lead to a different structural approach—but felt bound to follow historical 
precedent that was established before the share immobilization reforms. Id. at *11–25 (arguing that 
Delaware law should look through Cede and recognize the custodian banks and brokers as record holders 
of the shares). 
 109 Dell Inc., 143 A.3d at 52 (“[Earlier decisions] address a situation in which there is an absence of 
proof. In each of those cases, no evidence was available to show how Cede voted the particular shares for 
which appraisal was sought . . . . It does not necessarily follow that just because in some cases there is no 
evidence regarding how Cede voted, then in other cases where it does exist the parties cannot introduce 
it and the court cannot consider it.”). 
 110 See infra Section III.B.2.a. 
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A more common appraisal problem occurs when it is simply impossible 
to trace an owner’s shares back to a specific vote. This can happen, for 
instance, when an investor buys a block of stock after the record date for the 
vote and seeks to exercise an appraisal claim. This strategy, sometimes called 
“appraisal arbitrage,” became prominent in 2007, when an important 
Delaware case took a permissive view on the availability of appraisal 
rights.111 In that case, a biotech company named Transkaryotic Therapies had 
decided to sell itself to Shire Pharmaceuticals for $37 per share.112 A group 
of twelve beneficial owners, holding nearly 11 million shares, disliked this 
price and filed an appraisal claim.113 The problem, however, was that they 
had bought almost 8 million of their shares after voting rights for the merger 
had been severed by the passage of the record date but before the deadline to 
file for appraisal.114 Did this after-bought stock qualify for appraisal? 
As we might expect, the continuous record holder for these shares was 
Cede. It was the formal legal owner of the Transkaryotic stock both before 
and after the plaintiffs purchased their shares; only the identity of the 
beneficial holders had changed.115 Accordingly, the Delaware court 
considered how Cede had ultimately “voted” its position: 12.9 million shares 
voted yes and 16.9 million shares abstained or voted no.116 It was impossible 
to determine whether the plaintiffs’ 8 million shares belonged in the former 
group or the latter because, unlike the Dell case, there was no forensic 
evidence about how the plaintiffs’ shares were actually voted. 
The court allowed the lawsuit to proceed, under the logic that enough 
nonpositive Cede votes existed to support the plaintiffs’ exercise of appraisal 
rights for the 8 million shares.117 In other words, as long as there are enough 
“qualified” votes to cover a petitioner’s claims, appraisal claims remain 
viable. This decision seems to have sparked a surge of appraisal arbitrage 
lawsuits, where latecomer purchasers routinely object to an announced 
merger and insist that their shares are the ones that qualify for this legal 
right.118 As I have argued elsewhere, this is not necessarily a bad 
 
 111 See In re Appraisal of Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., No. Civ.A. 1554-CC, 2007 WL 1378345 
(Del. Ch. May 2, 2007). 
 112 Id. at *1. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. at *1–2. 
 116 Id. at *1. 
 117 Id. at *4. Query what would have happened if a claimant had sought to exercise the rights for 18 
million shares or if two groups of claimants had sought to exercise the rights for 9 million shares each. 
 118 See, e.g., Korsmo & Myers, supra note 95, at 1578–79 (exploring but ultimately rejecting the 
theory that Transkaryotic led to a large number of appraisal suits). 
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development,119 and Transkaryotic is clearly consistent with Delaware’s 
historical treatment of record shareholders as the group that formally 
matters.120 Of course there might also be concerns about the expanded use of 
latecomer appraisal claims, especially if the risk of a large lawsuit blocks 
value-enhancing deals or leads to an increase in strike suits.121 
Debating the question of whether expanded appraisal rights is a good 
or bad development, however, is not the point of this Article. As with the 
Section 11-tracing jurisprudence,122 the rise of appraisal arbitrage exposes a 
clear mismatch between the use of fungible bulk for stock settlement 
practices and the grant of legal rights to shareholders. In both cases, the 
relevant corporate law was established and developed during an earlier era 
when questions about ownership status were rarely so complex. Today, the 
same precedents bind, but resolution of a legal claim often relies on a largely 
indeterminate inquiry into the genealogy of shares. The gears do not mesh, 
and this is not a sensible approach to corporate law. 
2. Illegitimate Voting 
Another cluster of concerns arises when an actor retains franchise rights 
without economic exposure to the consequences of a decision. There are 
numerous variants of this problem, which has been dubbed “empty voting” 
in the literature.123 For instance, an investor might buy a position in a 
company that is the target of a merger bid, sell her shares after the record 
date but before the date of the actual vote, and cast her votes against the 
merger to block the deal. Though it may seem unlikely for her to bother to 
 
 119 See George S. Geis, supra note 50, at 1661–65 (exploring how appraisal claims might act as a 
“back-end market for corporate control” in the face of an allegedly inadequate merger price). It is also 
worth emphasizing, however, that this decision might create practical problems—especially if more 
shares seek to assert a claim than are qualified under the Transkaryotic inquiry. A court would either need 
to allocate qualified shares among the individual claimants or come up with some other method for 
determining who gets to sue. This interesting problem may remain academic, however, even if traceable 
shares do not change the law, because voter apathy may generate a sufficient number of abstentions to 
support all appraisal claims. 
 120 See, e.g., In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., No. 9322-VCL, 2015 WL 4313206, at *9 (Del. Ch. July 
13, 2015). Other cases have confirmed the lack of a legal tracing obligation for shareholder plaintiffs. See 
Merion Capital LP v. BMC Software, Inc., No. 8900-VCG, 2015 WL 6164771, at *11 (Del. Ch. Oct. 21, 
2015); In re Appraisal of Ancestry.com, Inc., No. 8173-VCG, 2015 WL 399726, at *15 (Del. Ch. Jan. 
30, 2015). 
 121 See, e.g., Richard A. Booth, The Real Problem with Appraisal Arbitrage, 72 BUS. LAW. 325 
(2017) (evaluating several possible concerns about appraisal arbitrage). But see Korsmo & Myers, supra 
note 95, at 1588–97 (arguing that appraisal cases are less likely to lead to strike suits (meritless suits 
brought for settlement value) because plaintiffs must bear the risk of a lower valuation and therefore have 
an incentive not to bring spurious claims). 
 122 See supra Section I.C.1.a. 
 123 In the mid-2000s, Henry Hu and Bernard Black described these problems extensively. See Hu & 
Black, Hedge Funds, supra note 10; Hu & Black, New Vote Buying, supra note 10. 
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vote in this scenario, there can be ways for the investor to take economic 
positions that will profit from this kind of spoilsport vote. 
Consider a case involving the Canadian telecom firm Telus.124 This 
company had established two classes of stock, one with voting rights and one 
without. The voting shares traded at about a 5% premium to the nonvoting 
shares.125 Telus eventually decided to eliminate this disparate treatment to 
address investor concerns about a lack of franchise rights by consolidating 
both classes of stock into a single class where everyone could vote.126 But 
Telus ignored the trading price differential, and its proposal sought to 
combine both classes of stock on identical terms. In response to this news, 
the price gap narrowed quickly, and the two classes of stock converged on a 
similar price.127 
Mason Capital, a U.S.-based hedge fund, saw an opportunity. It bought 
voting shares of Telus, while simultaneously shorting both the voting and 
nonvoting shares.128 This strategy allowed Mason to hedge away any 
economic interest in the voting shares while retaining nearly twenty percent 
of the vote.129 Further, the net short position in the nonvoting shares allowed 
Mason to profit if the proposal failed and the relative price gap of the 
nonvoting shares dropped back to prior levels. In essence, Mason had 
constructed a situation where it had strong ability and incentives to cast votes 
in a way that would stymie the attempted transaction.130 
Lawmakers have not ignored empty voting problems,131 but designing 
a treatment for this malady is difficult. More disclosure is one option, though, 
as suggested by the Telus story, the schemes used to perpetrate illegitimate 
voting can grow complex. Hedging strategies are not always easy to identify, 
and investors will sometimes arrive on an election day with far more votes 
 
 124 In re TELUS Corp., 2012 BCSC 1919 (Can. B.C.). This case is described in more detail in Wolf-
Georg Ringe, Empty Voting Revisited: The Telus Saga, 28 J. INT’L BANKING & FIN. L. 154 (2013). 
 125 TELUS, 2012 BCSC 1919, para. 12. 
 126 Ringe, supra note 124. 
 127 Id. 
 128 TELUS, 2012 BCSC 1919, paras. 31–37. By taking short positions in these securities, Mason sold 
shares that it did not at the time own. 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. In the event, Telus became aware of the situation and elected to use an alternative Canadian 
judicial procedure (a “plan of arrangement”) to accomplish the recapitalization. The plan had to be 
certified by the court as fair and reasonable under the circumstances, and the court was willing to consider 
Mason’s attempted sabotage in its deliberations. Id. paras. 54–69. 
 131 See, e.g., Kurz v. Holbrook, 989 A.2d 140, 178 (Del. Ch. 2010) (“Delaware decisions have 
exhibited consistent concern about transactions that create a misalignment between the voting interest 
and the economic interest.”), rev’d sub nom. in part on other grounds, Crown EMAK Partners, LLC v. 
Kurz, 992 A.2d 377 (Del. 2010). 
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than expected.132 Some commentators have called for regulation that 
removes votes from shareholders under certain situations,133 but it is tricky 
to delineate the range of conditions where such a remedy might be 
appropriate. There is also a risk that interventions to disenfranchise some 
shareholders will lead to new distortions.134 For these reasons, difficulties in 
the detection and prevention of empty voting persist. 
Even apart from explicit malfeasance, vesting voting rights with a group 
of people who have no reason to care about the outcome of a decision 
because they have already sold their shares weakens corporate governance. 
To make the political analogy,135 it is as if a sizeable population departed a 
democratic country, renounced their citizenship, but still cast ballots in a 
subsequent election. A lack of economic investment in the outcome also 
promotes apathy. Shareholder voting already suffers from concerns about 
low turnout and a perception that many investors are rationally apathetic.136 
Offering ballots to former owners cannot promote a healthier interest in the 
process. 
One response to these concerns might be to shorten the time between 
the record date and the actual date of the vote. Under current Delaware law, 
this period cannot be less than ten days,137 but a gap of twenty days, for 
instance, should lead to better voting incentives than a gap of fifty days.138 
Some firms are also starting to adopt bifurcated record dates, where one date 
is used to convey notice of a shareholder’s meeting, while another later date 
 
 132 See, e.g., Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, Equity and Debt Coupling and Equity Voting II: 
Importance and Extensions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 625, 723–24 (2008) (showing the possibility that 
economic ownership might also be hedged out while retaining appraisal rights). 
 133 See Ringe, supra note 124. 
 134 See, e.g., Tamara C. Belinfanti, Shareholder Cultivation and New Governance, 38 DEL. J. CORP. 
L. 789, 854 (2014). 
 135 In general, I would agree with Bayless Manning’s contention that there is little gain by comparing 
democratic elections to corporation elections. See Bayless Manning, The Shareholder’s Appraisal 
Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223, 226 (1962) (“[W]e have enough problems in the 
corporate field without importing additional nettles from the democratic political process.”). But this 
analogy seems apt. 
 136 See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 526–28 
(1990) (describing the general lack of shareholder incentives to vote); Kobi Kastiel & Yaron Nili, In 
Search of the “Absent” Shareholders: A New Solution to Retail Investors’ Apathy, 41 DEL. J. CORP. L. 
55, 59–66 (2016) (offering recent data on shareholder voting patterns at large firms). 
 137 See supra note 44. 
 138 To take a back-of-the-envelope example, if Apple has 5.25 billion shares outstanding, and an 
average trading volume of 30 million shares per day, then shortening the gap by 30 days could 
theoretically lead to a situation where the number of shareholder with ownership and voting rights 
increases by 17% of the total shareholder base (30 million shares times 30 days / 5.25 billion total shares). 
In actuality, of course, the increase is unlikely to be this large, as some of the buyers and sellers within 
the 30-day period may be short-term traders who will churn the same shares during these 30 days. 
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is used to convey the actual right to vote.139 The logical extension of this 
strategy, of course, is to establish a system that sets the record date one hour, 
or even one second, before the actual vote. Under current settlement 
practices, however, this approach is just not practicable because it takes too 
long to move back and forth through the various custodial layers. 
A third type of problem is perhaps just as important as empty voting 
and shareholder apathy: pure error. Professors Kahan and Rock have 
described numerous “hanging chads” in the corporate election process.140 
These situations arise when shareholder votes are cast or processed 
inaccurately due to the system’s complexity. Proxy materials may not arrive 
in time for beneficial shareholders to vote.141 Some last-minute votes (or 
changes to votes) may not be counted in order to meet various deadlines.142 
The total votes allocated to custodians by DTCC may not match the more 
detailed aggregation of the custodian’s client accounts.143 There are even 
some reported cases of overvoting, where more votes are cast than there are 
shares outstanding.144 For all of these reasons, close shareholder votes should 
not inspire confidence in accurate outcomes.145 
3. Feedback Loops Between Poor Voting Infrastructure and 
Corporate Governance Reform 
A more general concern with untraceable shares is that poor voting 
infrastructure might be creating feedback effects that thwart other sensible 
corporate governance adjustments. Of course, we cannot really know what 
corporate governance might look like with more accurate voting, but it is 
certainly possible that our existing system has limited the attractiveness of 
proxy access, shareholder bylaw proposals, or other governance initiatives. 
After all, lawmakers and other parties might be more nervous about 
establishing shareholder referendums on corporate decision-making if they 
fret about the underlying accuracy of investor votes. 
 
 139 See, e.g., Daniel E. Wolf et al., Kirkland M&A Update: Setting the Record (Date) Straight, 
KIRKLAND & ELLIS (Apr. 17, 2013), www.kirkland.com/siteFiles/Publications/MAUpdate_041713.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3KFA-QUCU]. 
 140 Kahan & Rock, supra note 4. 
 141 Id. at 1249. These unvoted shares can make it more difficult to obtain a quorum and also prevent 
approval of initiatives that require a majority of shares entitled to vote on a matter. Id. 
 142 Id. at 1251. 
 143 Id. at 1253. 
 144 Id. at 1258. 
 145 Further evidence of these concerns can be seen in vote recounts that result in altered outcomes. 
For example, in 2017, Proctor & Gamble fought a highly publicized director election contest where an 
activist investor initially lost the election but won the board seat during a recount. See Sharon Terlep & 
David Benoit, P&G Concedes Proxy Fight, Adds Nelson Peltz to Its Board, WALL. ST. J. (Dec. 15,  
2017, 7:18 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/p-g-concedes-proxy-fight-adds-nelson-peltz-to-its-board-
1513377485 [https://perma.cc/4YMZ-U959]. 
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The recent turmoil related to proxy access illustrates the impact that the 
concern about inaccurate voting has on corporate governance. Questions, 
such as whether shareholders should enjoy the right to include their preferred 
board candidates on a firm’s ballot or whether they should be forced to 
launch, and pay for, their own proxy battle to supplant an incumbent board, 
have commanded significant attention over the past decade, with a turbulent 
flurry of SEC reversals and judicial second-guessing.146 Others have told the 
story in detail,147 and there is no need to recount the specifics here. At this 
point, lawmakers seem to have abandoned efforts to mandate proxy access 
while still allowing individual shareholder groups to seek these rights 
through private ordering and shareholder proposals.148 
This may be the best outcome, as one might question the wisdom of a 
one-size-fits-all approach.149 But it is natural to wonder whether this same 
equilibrium would have been reached if lawmakers had more confidence that 
shareholder votes reflected unbiased incentives and could be processed 
accurately. 
Similarly, while we have seen a lot of recent activity in shareholder 
proposals that influence firm decision-making,150 some have questioned 
whether this is a sensible way to govern.151 Why should a handful of fringe 
 
 146 See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, The Destructive Ambiguity of Federal Proxy Access, 61 EMORY L.J. 435, 
457–75 (2012) (describing federalism challenges related to proxy access and advocating for private 
ordering solutions); Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, The Insignificance of Proxy Access, 97 VA. L. REV. 
1347, 1426–32 (2011) (asserting that many investors would not make use of proxy access and that the net 
effect of these changes would be minimal). 
 147 Id. 
 148 See, e.g., Catherine G. Dearlove & A. Jacob Werrett, Proxy Access by Private Ordering: A Review 
of the 2012 and 2013 Proxy Seasons, 69 BUS. LAW. 155, 158-60 (2013) (examining specific actions by 
firms shortly after it became clear in the case law that shareholder proposals to grant proxy access would 
be permitted). 
 149 The debate chugs along with proponents of proxy access arguing that managerial accountability 
and collective action problems require liberal proxy access. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, 
Private Ordering and the Proxy Access Debate, 65 BUS. LAW. 329, 349–50 (2010) (arguing against a no-
access default rule); Bo Becker et al., Does Shareholder Proxy Access Improve Firm Value? Evidence 
from the Business Roundtable’s Challenge, 56 J.L. & ECON. 127, 157 (2013) (presenting empirical 
analysis that financial markets place a positive value on the increased availability of proxy access). Not 
everyone agrees. Jill Fisch, for instance, has responded that universal access will lead to unjustified new 
expenses, special interest board representation that will lead to intra-shareholder conflicts, and other 
concerns. See Fisch, supra note 146; see also Kahan & Rock, supra note 146, at 1352–53 (arguing that 
proxy access may lead to increased costs, some internal conflicts, and some positive outcomes, but that 
it is unlikely to matter due to large institutional ownership of shares). 
 150 See Ronald O. Mueller et al., Shareholder Proposal Developments During the 2017 Proxy 
Season, GIBSON DUNN (June 29, 2017), https://www.gibsondunn.com/shareholder-proposal-
developments-during-the-2017-proxy-season [https://perma.cc/ZXA6-AHT6] (reporting 943 
shareholder proposals in 2015, 916 proposals in 2016, and 827 proposals in 2017). 
 151 See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. 
REV. 601, 603 (2006). 
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investors be able to hijack the agenda?152 To be sure, there is a reasonable 
counterargument: firms might embrace different models of shareholder 
participation to produce diverse governance practices.153 Indeed, we might 
imagine a variety of reforms that could clarify and extend the ability of 
shareholders to influence or constrain some corporate decisions.154 Before 
fully embarking on such a project, however, it would be important to see 
more integrity in the underlying infrastructure of shareholder voting. 
It is also worth considering whether a healthier settlement system might 
inspire more trust in board authority. Advocates of director primacy continue 
to assert that greater shareholder activism brings strategic ignorance and 
sows dysfunctional leadership teams.155 But the argument that delegated 
board authority should be trusted to represent the best interests of a firm’s 
owners relies on the bedrock of legitimacy that reliable elections supposedly 
confer. Much of the pushback against director primacy seems to arise from 
concerns that incumbent board members will be able to leverage the firm’s 
resources to maintain power even in the face of agency abuses.156 It is at least 
conceivable that a more accurate and responsive system to elect directors, 
and to sue them if necessary, would dampen the cry for greater shareholder 
power because it would become easier for shareholders to respond when 
questionable managerial actions occur.157 
In sum, if we have a system that is more responsive to current 
shareholders, and less prone to error, then lawmakers and corporate 
managers might be willing to adopt other governance levers. It is impossible 
 
 152 Id. at 635. 
 153 See Luc Renneboog & Peter G. Szilagyi, The Role of Shareholder Proposals in Corporate 
Governance, 17 J. CORP. FIN. 167, 172–73 (2011) (claiming that recent shareholder proposals are 
receiving more support); D. Gordon Smith et al., Private Ordering with Shareholder Bylaws, 
80 FORDHAM L. REV. 125, 127 (2011) (advocating for more shareholder democracy). 
 154 See Smith et al., supra note 153, at 181–87 (proposing several, mostly technical, changes to 
Delaware law that would clarify and extend shareholder participation in firm governance by making it 
easier for shareholders to adopt new (and substantive) corporate bylaws). 
 155 See Bainbridge, supra note 151, at 603–15. 
 156 The agency cost problem has been discussed extensively in the legal and economic literature. The 
foundation for much of this work can be found in Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of 
the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). 
Additional discussions of agency abuses can be found in Kenneth J. Arrow, The Economics of Agency, 
in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 37 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser 
eds., 1985); Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review, 14 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 
57 (1989); Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288 (1980); 
and Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem, 
51 ECONOMETRICA 7 (1983). 
 157 This all assumes, of course, that shareholders are somehow able to detect the agency abuses; this 
information asymmetry lies at the heart of many problems. See supra note 156 (listing sources discussing 
information asymmetry problems). 
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to draw more solid conclusions, however, because this theory relies on 
counterfactual assumptions about what might happen in the presence of 
traceable shares. 
*        *        * 
To quickly recap, then, the financial services industry seems to have 
cobbled together a functioning settlement and clearing system that is a stark 
improvement over paper-based trading. But corporate law has paid a price 
for the resulting complexity. The mechanisms for managing and tallying 
shareholder votes encompass intricate layers of intermediaries that do not 
inspire confidence in accurate outcomes. Some legal rights, such as Section 
11 claims and appraisal lawsuits, are linked to impossible determinations 
about when a specific share of stock was issued or how it was voted. And 
timing delays can lead to a problematic decoupling of vested franchise rights 
and economic ownership. These and other nasty entanglements caused by 
complexity in the exchange infrastructure are unhealthy for corporate 
governance. Is there a better way? 
II. CREATING TRACEABLE SHARES 
In 2017, DTCC announced a pilot project with IBM to clear securities 
through a customized distributed ledger system, sometimes described as 
blockchain technology.158 This initiative will not impact stock markets, as it 
focuses on the settlement of credit derivatives.159 Nevertheless, the project is 
important for several reasons. First, it signals that DTCC is beginning to 
embrace distributed ledger technology to pursue cost savings and other 
strategic benefits.160 Second, the effort demonstrates that large technology 
firms like IBM, with support from smaller “fintech” partners, are willing to 
stand behind distributed ledgers and believe that they can be used to clear 
financial trades on a meaningful scale. And third, the project enjoys the 
backing of some of the world’s most important financial institutions, 
including Barclays, Citi, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, JP Morgan, UBS, 
Wells Fargo, and others.161 
 
 158 See Michael del Castillo, $11 Trillion Bet: DTCC to Process Derivatives with Blockchain Tech, 
COINDESK (published Jan. 9, 2017, 12:59 PM; updated Dec. 21, 2017, 1:48 PM), http://www.coindesk. 
com/11-trillion-bet-dtcc-clear-derivatives-blockchain-tech [https://perma.cc/EGV5-HGND]. This is a 
major initiative but still one that would be dwarfed by any effort to transform stock settlement and clearing 
systems. 
 159 Id. 
 160 The CEO of DTCC’s derivatives service subsidiary stated, “We believe our own internal savings 
will cost-justify the project [with] additional saving to the industry.” Id. 
 161 These banks are all members of the “R3CEV consortium,” created in 2015 to help coordinate 
banks interested in adopting distributed ledgers. Id. 
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As efforts like this take root over the coming decade (the Australian 
Stock Exchange has launched a similar undertaking162), it is becoming 
increasingly probable that the aging, back-office infrastructure of stock 
settlement will be retrofitted with new technology. We have already 
witnessed the revolution in front-end exchange—as open outcry trading pits 
and loud people in bright jackets gave way to the hum of server farms and 
click of electronic matching algorithms. Distributed ledger technology may 
soon spark a similar disruption to the back end of securities exchange. 
A. Distributed Ledger Mechanics 
In many ways, distributed ledger clearing is the conceptual opposite of 
current systems.163 DTCC now uses a centralized, trust-based, and highly 
guarded method that relies on economies of scale to conduct back-office 
processing.164 Distributed ledger technology would replace this with a 
decentralized, trustless, widely replicated, and (possibly) transparent mode 
of exchange. How does it work? 
1. The General Idea 
A distributed ledger is simply a sequential database of assets that is 
shared across a network of users.165 It is distributed in the sense that all 
participants in the network have their own copy of the ledger identifying both 
the historical transactions and the resulting ownership rights associated with 
the entire group of assets. By comparison, most economic entities currently 
use double-entry bookkeeping ledgers to track the disposition of their assets; 
these ledgers are both private and fragmented. They only contain information 
related to the specific assets that each firm owns. Distributed ledgers, on the 
other hand, are more akin to government-managed real property registration 
systems, where anyone might examine current and historical ownership 
claims on a given parcel of property. But while public property records are 
typically centralized and housed in a single location, with limited 
accessibility, a distributed ledger can be split into hundreds or thousands of 
 
 162 See Jackie Range, New Australian Securities Exchange Chief Defends Blockchain Plans, FIN. 
TIMES (Sept. 4, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/45851b58-62d1-11e6-8310-ecf0bddad227 [https:// 
perma.cc/EKV6-DAT4]. 
 163 See, e.g., DTCC, EMBRACING DISRUPTION: TAPPING THE POTENTIAL OF DISTRIBUTED LEDGERS 
TO IMPROVE THE POST-TRADE LANDSCAPE (2016) [hereinafter DTCC WHITE PAPER], 
http://www.dtcc.com/news/2016/january/25/new-dtcc-white-paper-calls-for-leveraging-distributed-
ledger-technology [https://perma.cc/3T7Z-VEJA] (discussing conceptual differences between current 
clearing systems and the proposed distributed ledger technology). 
 164 Id. at 1. 
 165 Id.; see also David Mills et al., Distributed Ledger Technology in Payments, Clearing, and 
Settlement 10–11 (Wash.: Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Finance and Economics Discussion 
Series 2016-095, 2016), https://doi.org/10.17016/FEDS.2016.095 [https://perma.cc/5VBU-GVHT]. 
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identical copies and situated in the scattered computer systems of individual 
members or users.166 
Version control obviously becomes critical. It would not do to have a 
dishonest participant rapidly sell the same asset twice, before records can be 
updated. Accordingly, changes must be incorporated quickly across all 
versions of the ledger through a synchronization protocol. There are multiple 
ways to manage this task. For instance, rights to edit the database might be 
“unpermissioned” and open to public users under a consensus protocol where 
anyone who plays by preordained rules can modify records, or the rights 
might be secured in a way that controls or limits who can make changes and 
how these changes must occur.167 Moreover, the distributed ledger can be 
public and fully transparent, or it can remain private and only accessible by 
a limited number of members.168 Indeed, to accurately describe a distributed 
ledger system, we must distinguish between four alternatives: (1) traditional 
ledgers where a single copy is privately retained by each user (“Type 1”) 
(which is not a distributed ledger); (2) private distributed ledgers where there 
are multiple copies of the ledger that may only be viewed and changed by 
authorized participants (“Type 2”); (3) public distributed ledgers that are 
viewable by many but modifiable only by a subset of trusted actors (“Type 
3”); and (4) publicly shared distributed ledgers that may be viewed and 
modified by any user under consensus protocols (“Type 4”).169 The 
cryptocurrency bitcoin, currently the most (in)famous application of 
distributed ledger technology, is an example of the fourth variant.170 By 
contrast, the second and third variants seem to be the leading choices for new 
financial market clearing platforms.171 
The accuracy and security of a distributed ledger is maintained through 
blockchain technology, which ensures that all copies match and that all 
modifications reflecting new transactions follow the same path. As users buy 
and sell the relevant assets, blockchain technology gathers and organizes the 
details of each transaction into a string of data according to an established 
formatting algorithm.172 Multiple transactions are then grouped and 
transferred into a data block.173 This block is linked, or “chained,” to the 
 
 166 Mills et al., supra note 165, at 10. 
 167 Id. at 12. 
 168 Id. 
 169 See DTCC WHITE PAPER, supra note 163. 
 170 See Andrea Pinna & Wiebe Ruttenberg, Distributed Ledger Technologies in Securities Post-
Trading: Revolution or Evolution?, at 10, European Central Bank Occasional Paper Series No. 172 (Apr. 
2016), https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpops/ecbop172.en.pdf [https://perma.cc/7DNJ-NQ7E]. 
 171 Id. at 11. 
 172 See, e.g., id. at 12. 
 173 Id. 
113:227 (2018) Traceable Shares 
257 
earlier blocks of transactional data in the ledger, time-stamped, and 
processed in a way that both refers to and verifies prior transactions. In other 
words, the cryptography is designed so that it becomes progressively more 
difficult for older blocks to be rewritten, increasing the verifiability and 
security of prior transactions.174 The results are broadcast to members in a 
synchronization protocol, and the system starts a new cycle. 
2. A (Slightly) More Technical Examination 
The technical details of blockchain cryptography are mostly beyond the 
scope of this Article,175 but a slightly more extensive description might be 
helpful for understanding the transformative nature of distributed ledgers. 
First, consider a Type 4 (public distributed) ledger. A member joining the 
distributed ledger network will receive unique public and private encryption 
keys. The private key is used to certify a transaction and can be verified by 
others in the network.176 If a member wants to settle a fresh transaction, she 
uses her private key to “sign” and transmit the relevant details (such as which 
assets are being sold and to whom they are being transferred) through a string 
of data.177 The public key is analogous to an email identifier, and it allows 
others—such as a buying party—to locate the selling member in order to 
send funds related to the exchange.178 Any such transfer to a member via their 
public key can only be unlocked with that member’s private key.179 As more 
of these transactions occur, they are queued, processed, and eventually 
published throughout the system according to the system architecture (more 
on this in a moment). This makes the ledger verifiable to any participant with 
read permission, in a way that should render the history of each transaction 
secure and irreversible.180 
The right to publish changes to a distributed ledger may vary according 
to the system. With an open, public network, such as bitcoin, any entity that 
accomplishes a specific task might earn the right to add the next block of 
 
 174 Id. 
 175 For a more extended discussion, see Kariappa Bheemaiah, Why Business Schools Need to Teach 
About the Blockchain (Mar. 2, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Northwestern University 
Law Review). 
 176 Id. at 7–8. 
 177 Id.; see also Christian Catalini & Joshua S. Gans, Some Simple Economics of the Blockchain (MIT 
Sloan Research Paper No. 5191-16, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
2874598 [https://perma.cc/3SD8-XFRB]. 
 178 See Bheemaiah, supra note 175, at 8. 
 179 Id. 
 180 The security features of a distributed ledger make theft extremely difficult. See infra notes 190–
94 and accompanying text. 
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data, subject to confirmation of its success.181 The task will be arduous—
such as solving the next iteration of a complex mathematical puzzle—but 
also easy to verify as correct once a solution is presented.182 With privately 
permissioned networks, Types 2 and 3, the right to modify might not require 
solving a task; preauthorized agents, such as banks, can simply add the new 
block.183 
Independent participants may have incentives to record the details of 
exchange transactions between other parties. For example, the solution to a 
mathematical puzzle might incorporate the details from completed 
transactions at the top of the recording queue.184 Winning the race to solve 
each iteration thus requires participants to process and memorialize the most 
recent transactions.185 The parties seeking to record their asset transfer details 
might pay a commission to the recording member who successfully 
publishes the transaction in the next block of data.186 Or, members might earn 
a “point” or “token” when they become the first person to solve the next 
 
 181 See Pinna & Ruttenberg, supra note 170, at 12–13. This confirmation of success, or transaction 
validation, will arise under a prearranged set of rules. For example, a member who successfully mines a 
new solution to the current iteration of the challenge could be required to submit their answer to a 
transaction validator who would quickly verify that the solution was correct and then spread the new 
block to other transaction validator nodes. Once a majority of these validators agree that this is the first 
viable solution (under the prearranged synchronization protocols), then the new block would be indelibly 
written, and the process would begin anew. Id. 
 182 With bitcoin, for example, a member must find (or “mine”) a numerical solution that takes data 
from the most recent solution and the valid transactions to be recorded as inputs. The goal is to combine 
this data with another number, called a nonce, in a way that provides an output, when run through the 
relevant hash function, that accomplishes some specific task—such as producing an output string that 
begins with twelve zeros. The first person to accomplish this “wins” the right to write the data to the 
distributed ledger, gains a bitcoin or token of value, and starts the cycle anew. All others must begin from 
scratch with the new output string, and any leftover work from the prior iteration will probably be useless. 
The task is thus (1) difficult to accomplish, as the solution nonce can only arise through trial and error 
and massive computer processing power; and (2) easy to verify by looking at the solution output (for 
example, are there really twelve zeros at the start of the output?). Moreover, the difficulty of the task can 
be modified on the fly in an effort to render a solution slower or faster. Continuing with the bitcoin 
example, if the goal of the system is to generate a new block approximately every ten minutes, then the 
solution might require only ten zeros at the start of the string in order to expedite a solution, or require 
fourteen zeros at the start of the string in order to delay the next solution nonce. See Bheemaiah, supra 
note 175, at 10. 
 183 Pinna & Ruttenberg, supra note 170, at 12–15. 
 184 Id. at 12. 
 185 Id. 
 186 Again, borrowing from the bitcoin example, a seller will typically pay a transaction fee to the 
recording party denominated in some fraction of a bitcoin. For example, the current cost to record one 
byte of data in the system might be 400 satoshis, where one satoshi (the smallest unit of bitcoin currency) 
equals one hundred millionth (0.00000001) of a bitcoin. As one might imagine, the recording fees will 
float according to the supply and demand of recording bandwidth. A system can also set fixed rates, 
minimum and maximum rates, premium rates for priority recording, and use other features related to 
queueing incentives. See Bheemaiah, supra note 175, at 10. 
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iteration of the problem, offer proof of this work, and publish another block 
in the chain.187 These tokens might then be monetized (as with bitcoin and 
other cryptocurrency systems) and become valuable in their own right.188 
In closed distributed ledger systems, Types 2 and 3, it may not be 
necessary to create cryptocurrency rewards via the generation of tokens. The 
payment of commissions should be sufficient to incentivize members to 
develop the next block in the chain. Indeed, if the members with modification 
rights enjoy sufficient levels of trust, mining for the solution to a complex 
mathematical puzzle may not be needed at all. The modifying parties will 
simply add a new block whenever enough transactions are queued to justify 
the next link in the chain.189 
Embedded throughout the use of distributed ledgers is a processing 
“hash function,” the heart of the cryptography. A hash function is simply an 
algorithm that takes a variable-length string of data as an input, crunches the 
information, and spits out a fixed-length string of numbers and letters.190 The 
hash function used by bitcoin, for example, was initially devised by the 
National Security Agency (NSA) and produces a 256-bit output.191 An 
identical output result is always obtained when the same string of input data 
is fed into the function.192 But it is exceedingly difficult to reverse engineer 
the input data by observing only the output data; changing just one character 
 
 187 Id. In actuality, many transactions are bundled into every “solution” to increase capacity. The 
ability to solve enough iterations of the problem to meet underlying transactional demand is a possible 
limit to the underlying capacity of any blockchain clearing system. On days with a high volume of stock 
trades, for instance, it is possible that a backlog of trades will gather to be bundled and processed by the 
solving members. This could raise the same concerns as the paper system crisis of the 1960s, but there 
would also be new worries relating to the timing and integrity of the synchronization protocol. See supra 
notes 15–20 and accompanying text. Any backlog would also raise questions about the optimal way to 
process queued transactions. Should everything be done on a first-in-first-out basis? Or should transacting 
parties who wish to receive recording priority be able to pay a higher fee to a recording member in order 
to jump the queue? These types of question can be sidestepped, of course, if capacity is not constrained. 
 188 Indeed, “initial coin offering” markets have started to emerge for various cryptocurrencies. 
Investors buy the virtual currencies from successful miners in the hope that each coin or token will 
appreciate in value. These markets are not the focus of this Article, though it is worth noting that they are 
starting to present thorny regulatory questions. See, e.g., The Market in Initial Coin Offerings Risks 
Becoming a Bubble, ECONOMIST (Apr. 27, 2017), http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-
economics/21721425-it-may-also-spawn-valuable-innovations-market-initial-coin-offerings [https:// 
perma.cc/Y6G9-S4G7]. 
 189 Removing the need to solve a complex puzzle eliminates the creation of cryptocurrency coins 
because it allows for the creation of new blocks on demand. This increases the speed at which a distributed 
ledger can record transactions, which should also increase the security of a network as a rapidly evolving 
chain becomes more difficult for a rogue member to rewrite. See Catalini & Gans, supra note 177, at 6–
11 (discussing verification costs). 
 190 Bheemaiah, supra note 175, at 9. 
 191 Id. 
 192 Id. 
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in the input string will completely transform the output of a hash function.193 
In order to create the next block in the chain, a member will need to take the 
output hash string from the most recent block and compute a new output hash 
string that incorporates the details of the queued transactions for recording, 
adds a time stamp for additional security, and meets any other predefined 
requirements.194 
In this way, the most recently created block intersects with older blocks 
in the chain. Because the only way to develop a new block is to begin with 
the previous block’s output string—and because the only way to obtain the 
previous block’s output string is to crunch the most recent transactional 
records with the hash function—there will be an ongoing confirmation of 
prior transactions that grows stronger as the length of the chain increases.195 
Any effort to rewrite history, by going back several links to change the 
recorded owner of a given asset, will generate a different output string when 
run through the hash function. This alteration would not match the results 
obtained by other members and would be rejected.196 The only way to 
succeed in stealing assets through a modified distributed ledger would be to 
find an alternative solution to the hash algorithm and quickly permeate this 
alternative reality down through subsequent links in the chain in a way that 
complies with the synchronization protocol. This is thought to be 
exceedingly difficult, though not impossible,197 because the correct chain 
continues to move forward as other members add links—making any attempt 
at theft a moving target. 
 
 193 Id. 
 194 See supra note 156. The predefined requirements may be arbitrary (such as producing an output 
hash string that begins with a certain number of zeros), and typically serve to limit the supply of blocks 
that can be generated. 
 195 Bheemaiah, supra note 175, at 9–10. 
 196 In an open system like bitcoin, the resulting output hash function might also not meet the 
requirements of the algorithmic puzzle. For instance, changing the owner of an asset recorded in the prior 
link would lead to an output hash function that would not start with the required number of zeros. Id. 
 197 There are numerous online discussions about attacks and counterattacks of various 
cryptocurrencies. One notorious battle occurred in 2016 when an anonymous party attacked a 
cryptocurrency named ethereum seeking to steal assets from some other members. The event attracted 
widespread media attention and was ultimately defended by a controversial “fork” response, under which 
the system returned to a period before the attempted theft and created an alternative chain to stymie the 
theft. For some, this cure was worse than the disease, as it demonstrated that blockchain history might be 
rewritten under extreme circumstances, undermining some of the public trust that was thought to 
accompany distributed ledgers. See Klint Finley, A $50 Million Hack Just Showed That the DAO Was All 
Too Human, WIRED (June 18, 2016, 4:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/06/50-million-hack-just-
showed-dao-human [https://perma.cc/X68D-Z3VA]; Jonathan Ore, How a $64M Hack Changed the Fate 
of Ethereum, Bitcoin’s Closest Competitor, CBC NEWS (Aug. 28, 2016, 9:00 AM), 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/ethereum-hack-blockchain-fork-bitcoin-1.3719009 
[https://perma.cc/9GC7-RM8M]. 
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Finally, each member will need to keep an accurate version of the 
current ledger, or version control problems will proliferate. For this reason, 
distributed ledgers must incorporate a synchronization protocol. The details 
of alternative protocols can grow complicated,198 but in a nutshell, a member 
seeking to add a new block must generally broadcast its request and wait for 
a majority (or supermajority) of participants to agree that the solution works 
(if proof of work is required) and is timely (first in line to add a new block).199 
Again, differences may arise between public and permissioned ledgers,200 but 
once the pending block is verified, the new chain of data should be 
irrevocably connected. The data is disseminated throughout the network, and 
the next cycle begins. 
Many questions remain, of course, about the efficacy, governance, and 
security of distributed ledgers. Will there be enough capacity to process all 
of the pending transactions, or might everything bog down when volume 
spikes? Is there a natural limit or end point to the use of a specific hash 
function, such that a mature distributed ledger might need to be transplanted 
to a new system after some period of time? To some extent, these concerns 
might be addressed or mitigated by establishing variable proof of work 
standards201 or by using metasynchronization protocols that allow temporary 
differences to arise. Multiple chains could possibly be reconciled later by 
braiding individual strands into a master chain.202 But these strategies, in 
turn, would raise governance concerns, such as who should be entitled to 
 
 198 For example, some networks may limit the pace at which any single member can broadcast new 
blocks through an iterative process that requires everyone else to also propose a new block. This mitigates 
the ability of a single rogue participant to spam inaccurate information, but it may also limit the pace at 
which changes can be made. There are other design possibilities, but the output must always be consensus. 
See Mills et al., supra note 165, at 13–14. 
 199 See Pinna & Ruttenberg, supra note 170, at 12–15. 
 200 With public ledgers, for instance, the validation process may require individual members to verify 
that the solution is correct. With a private ledger that does not contain a proof-of-work requirement, the 
key question may be only who is first in line to add the next block. Id. at 12–14. 
 201 The use of a variable number of zeros at the beginning of the bitcoin hash function is a good 
example of this. See supra note 156. Making a puzzle easier or harder to solve is a good way to increase 
or decrease the system capacity. In some cases, it may be possible to write rules in advance that establish 
when and how this variability will be implemented. For example, if the goal is to add a new block 
approximately every ten minutes, then a failure to meet this deadline with the most recent block or with 
several blocks in a row could trigger an easier version of the puzzle. Conversely, excessively rapid block 
creation would lead to more difficult problem architecture. 
 202 This topic raises another important question—Can disparate, distributed ledger systems be 
stitched together in a way that avoids fragmentation? This is conceivably quite important for the use of 
distributed ledgers to settle and clear stock trades, because brokers or intermediaries may not all wish to 
adopt a single system at the outset of this project. If several systems are put in place at the same time, it 
may become necessary to combine the data in some manner in order to obtain comprehensive information 
about firm ownership. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
262 
exercise any discretion that is built into the adaptive rules,203 and whether the 
power to make these changes would create new risks of fraud or abuse. 
Perhaps the most worrisome concern is security. Distributed ledgers are 
designed to be tamper-resistant, but it is always possible that a rogue member 
might hack a system to steal assets from other parties by retroactively 
rewriting the history of asset transfers. Because the ledgers are supposed to 
provide an indisputable record related to the truth of ownership, it may not 
be easy to make a convincing case that something improper occurred. 
Relatedly, an important distributed ledger may create a tempting target for 
terrorism and invite attacks that seek only to harm instead of steal. Generally, 
these types of attacks are thought to be difficult to accomplish because of the 
historical record that permeates the database and the consensus-oriented 
synchronization protocols.204 But the risk is still there. 
Despite all this, commentators have grown increasingly excited about 
the ways that distributed ledgers might be used for innovation.205 Some 
predict that this technology will ultimately have as much impact on the 
economy as the invention of double-entry bookkeeping or the Internet.206 The 
applications are seemingly endless and often speculative. For example, some 
have suggested that distributed ledgers will unleash a new breed of “smart 
contracting,” where electronic agents can automatically execute and update 
agreements as various conditions unfold over time.207 It is not entirely clear 
what smart contracts mean or how code might replace law and human 
agency. Some uses of this technology are more straightforward, however, 
and it is not too hard to imagine how distributed ledgers could transform 
stock settlement and clearing processes.208 
B. New Stock Clearing Methods 
If we could snap our fingers and create an ideal stock clearing platform, 
we would probably abandon paper share certificates, along with the 
 
 203 See, e.g., Pinna & Ruttenberg, supra note 170, at 27. 
 204 See supra notes 163–68 and accompanying text. 
 205 See, e.g., DON TAPSCOTT & ALEX TAPSCOTT, BLOCKCHAIN REVOLUTION: HOW THE 
TECHNOLOGY BEHIND BITCOIN IS CHANGING MONEY, BUSINESS, AND THE WORLD (2016). 
 206 See, e.g., Blockchain: The Next Big Thing, ECONOMIST (May 9, 2015), https://www.economist. 
com/special-report/2015/05/09/the-next-big-thing [https://perma.cc/S9N4-SW9G]. 
 207 See Max Raskin, The Law and Legality of Smart Contracts, 1 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 305 (2017) 
(offering a more general discussion of smart contracts and their legal implications); Trevor I. Kiviat, Note, 
Beyond Bitcoin: Issues in Regulating Blockchain Transactions, 65 DUKE L.J. 569, 605–07 (2015) 
(discussing a smart contract to trade futures). 
 208 Typically, the first large-scale application of distributed ledger technology relates to improved, 
real-time payment systems. But better settlement and clearing architecture for securities is often not very 
far behind payment systems on the list of likely applications. See TAPSCOTT & TAPSCOTT, supra note 
205, at 18–19. 
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complicated and multi-layered distinction between record and beneficial 
owners. A share of stock would trade electronically, perhaps through brokers 
and exchanges, but the details of each transfer would be processed by a 
secured and trusted protocol that specifically identifies each share being 
exchanged. This information would be rapidly updated (ideally in real time) 
and accessible by appropriate parties with the right clearance or, 
conceivably, by the public. In short, we would have immediate clearing of 
stock transfers in a way that preserves a precise chain of title. 
Five or ten years ago, most experts would have dismissed this vision as 
fantasy. It was simply too difficult to imagine how state-of-the-art computing 
power could keep up with the ongoing tide of trades. Recently, however, it 
has become possible to envision how distributed ledger technology might be 
adopted to permit direct and rapid settlement of stock trades. 
Early platforms are emerging.209 The goal is to create a “golden ledger” 
of stockholders, reflecting the most current ownership data and substantially 
reducing, or perhaps even eliminating, the need for the custodial 
arrangements described in Part I of this Article. Piloting fintech firms 
anticipate processing thousands of transactions per second while maintaining 
a complete and perpetual record of all historical transactions related to any 
security.210 
One of the more interesting questions involves the role, if any, that 
banks, brokers, and other intermediaries might play in a new settlement 
platform.211 It is possible to imagine a world of complete disintermediation, 
where individual investors join exchanges directly, downloading software to 
participate as full members of a distributed ledger. They could buy or sell 
stock directly through the exchange and write changes to the distributed 
ledger under a public protocol akin to that used by bitcoin.212 
On the other hand, there are many reasons to believe that complete 
disintermediation will not occur. For one, some investors will continue to 
enjoy the financial advice that they receive from experts, and they might be 
 
 209 For example, one venture named SETL is building a custom blockchain application that allows 
brokers to settle transactions on a peer-to-peer distributed ledger. See Jemima Kelly, Computershare 
Teams Up with Start-up SETL on Blockchain Project, REUTERS (Apr. 28, 2016, 6:51 AM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-securities-blockchain-computershare/computershare-teams-up-with-
start-up-setl-on-blockchain-project-idUSKCN0XP1NL [https://perma.cc/YYF4-3NZM]. 
 210 See id. 
 211 See, e.g., Mills et al., supra note 165, at 6–8 (exploring the costs and benefits of intermediaries in 
distributed ledgers); DTCC WHITE PAPER, supra note 163 (same). 
 212 It is also possible, of course, to imagine a specialization of labor similar to the evolution of the 
bitcoin system. Investors uninterested in mining for new blocks might have their transactions queued for 
processing by other miners in the exchange. These miners may not trade actively in equity securities, but 
rather seek to generate revenues through commissions, the generation of cryptocurrency coins, or both. 
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loath to trade directly. Others may continue to seek the diversification and 
scale benefits that arise through mutual funds and alternative investments, 
such as hedge funds. Moreover, the security risks and capacity limitations 
associated with a public ledger stock exchange will probably be too great for 
most people to stomach in the near term. Recall that public blockchains 
require members to submit some proof of work in order to earn the right to 
add a new block to the distributed ledger.213 This has clear advantages in a 
world of distrust: one must incorporate the queued transactions for recording 
in the solution algorithm. However, it significantly limits the speed with 
which trades can be memorialized because all parties must wait for a new 
solution to be discovered through brute computing trial and error.214 
For these and other reasons, it is likely that banks and brokers will 
continue to play a role in the creation and operation of new stock clearing 
platforms. One can imagine, for instance, a project where a consortium of 
intermediaries establishes a private ledger where they are the only ones with 
viewing and modification rights. An investor seeking to buy or sell stock 
would contact a broker member to execute trades. The broker would locate 
a counterparty and then process and record each transaction on the 
distributed ledger.215 With just a small number of permissioned parties who 
trust each other, each broker would not need to solve an algorithmic puzzle; 
they could just write a new block as soon as a sufficient number of 
transactions are queued for processing.216 
From the client’s perspective, not much would seem to change. The 
brokers would continue to provide economic information and share 
positions. The trades would settle more quickly, and there would be a 
detailed and traceable record of title for every single share of stock. 
Depending on the level of visibility offered by the ledger, clients might be 
able to see ownership and trading data about other shareholders in a firm. It 
is also possible, however, that the platform might keep this information from 
individual investors.217 
 
 213 See supra notes 155–61 and accompanying text. 
 214 See supra note 156. 
 215 Various financial arrangements are possible to ensure that client funds are available to stand 
behind these trades in a manner consistent with current arrangements between broker and client (such as 
those relating to margin trading). 
 216 The threat of sanction or expulsion from the network for misdeeds might also mitigate bad 
behavior by brokers. 
 217 Determining how much access should be provided to historical trading data will raise interesting 
regulatory issues. For example, some investors or brokers may seek to monitor the identity of specific 
traders closely to determine whether senior executives at a firm or renowned external traders are changing 
their positions in order to glean information about the firm’s current prospects. In other words, there may 
be governance benefits to obtaining data about insider trades on a real-time basis. See, e.g., David 
Yermack, Corporate Governance and Blockchains, 21 REV. FIN. 7, 17–26 (2017). 
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Moving to a different clearing system would introduce some new costs. 
One advantage of fungible bulk is that intraday trades can be netted against 
each other in a way that reduces the ultimate need to record bookkeeping 
adjustments for every stock trade.218 Imagine, for instance, an active day-
trader who consistently buys a share of Amazon whenever the price hits $990 
and sells it at $1000. In a single volatile day, this hypothetical trader may 
move in and out of this stock several times or more. Under current systems, 
brokers need not worry about clearing each of these intraday transactions. 
Rather, the trader’s moves can just be netted against all of his other trades 
and tallied at the end of the day, or some equivalent processing milestone. 
For example, ten buys and nine sells would ultimately result in a need to 
settle and clear just one share of Amazon stock for this trader. In this same 
way, banks and brokers may first determine the total change in share position 
by all of their internal clients and only report this net change in position to 
DTCC at the end of the day. For large custodians, many of the accounting 
adjustments for internal clients might be accomplished within the walls of 
the bank or brokerage by moving money and share positions between 
clients.219 Only the residual amounts need be settled at the end of the day 
with DTCC. 
By contrast, under a distributed ledger system, every single move by 
our hypothetical day trader would need to be incorporated into the chain of 
title. This is not insurmountable, but it would mean that actively traded firms 
might have much longer histories of ownership and require more significant 
processing activity to track share provenance. 
Moreover, a number of important questions will need to be answered 
before distributed ledger platforms change stock clearing practices.220 Who 
would pay for an infrastructure rewiring project and why?221 Should a system 
be managed and/or viewable on a private distributed ledger or available for 
public access? What privacy protocols should be established for individual 
investors? Could a new system scale to handle the necessary volume of stock 
 
 218 See, e.g., Michael McClain, How Does DTCC Netting & Settlement Reduce Risk and Cost for the 
Industry?, DTCC (Nov. 28. 2017), http://www.dtcc.com/news/2017/november/28/how-does-dtcc-
netting-and-settlement-reduce-risk-and-cost-for-the-industry [https://perma.cc/ZUY5-LM8K]. 
 219 By some estimates, the use of netting allows banks and brokers to reduce clearing activity by 
ninety percent or more. Id. 
 220 See, e.g., Geis, supra note 50, at 1669–70. 
221 Many people would benefit from stock-clearing reforms: investors (through better 
governance and perhaps higher firm values), aspiring managers (through an ability to mount proxy 
contests), adjudicators (through clearer governance mechanisms), and perhaps those responsible 
for operating the new system (if they can command a reasonable profit for their services). But 
there is an obvious free-rider problem because once the clearinghouse is established, everyone 
can take the benefits without necessarily contributing funds for the completion of the efforts. 
Id. at 1669. 
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trades?222 Can pilot efforts or dual-system clearing processes be implemented 
to test new clearing platforms without leaping over a cliff?223 Who, if anyone, 
would ultimately retain governance rights over the clearing infrastructure, 
and would these governance rights introduce new security or regulatory 
concerns? Until these and other questions are answered, it is not obvious that 
clearing institutions, corporations, financial institutions, investors, and 
regulators will be willing to abandon a slow and clumsy system that works 
for a rapid and elegant system that relies on exciting but unproven 
technology. A major stock settlement failure would be catastrophic. 
In any event, the point of this Article is not to evangelize for change. 
The move to a new technology paradigm is not inevitable, but the promise 
of cheaper,224 faster, and (possibly) more secure clearing systems does mean 
that the odds of a transformation cannot be ignored. Any change is unlikely 
to happen overnight, but neither is this purely the stuff of science fiction. 
DTCC is testing the waters. Some companies have issued shares that trade 
electronically on a distributed ledger backbone.225 The former Governor of 
Delaware has launched an initiative to clarify how the state’s corporate law 
will work for distributed ledger stock transfers.226 The Australian Stock 
Exchange is transitioning everything to a distributed ledger clearing 
platform.227 And entrepreneurial tech firms, armed with funding from 
financial institutions, continue to grapple with the best ways to design new 
systems.228 It is not too early to consider the legal effects of an exchange 
technology that eliminates the need for centralized stock holdings in 
unidentified fungible bulk. 
 
 222 Daily trading volume vary significantly, but, by way of illustration, roughly one billion shares 
were traded on the NYSE each day during the first month of 2017. See NYSE Group Volume in All Stocks 
Traded, supra note 35. 
 223 The notion here is that trades would continue as normal, but over time an electronic signature 
would be added to more and more trades. Eventually, the system could be “switched on,” run in parallel 
for some time to permit testing, and eventually “take over” as the exclusive trading method. 
 224 One recent report estimates that banks might save $15–$20 billion per year by migrating clearing 
and other processes onto distributed ledger technologies. See SATANDER ET AL., THE FINTECH 2.0 PAPER: 
REBOOTING FINANCIAL SERVICES 14–15 (2015), https://www.finextra.com/finextra-
downloads/newsdocs/the%20fintech%202%200%20paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/5644-83RQ]. 
 225 See Cade Metz, Overstock Begins Trading Its Shares via the Bitcoin Blockchain, WIRED (Dec. 
15, 2016, 6:20 PM), https://www.wired.com/2016/12/overstock-com-issues-stock-via-bitcoin-
blockchain [https://perma.cc/6CRH-LSBU]. 
 226 See Andrea Tinianow & Caitlin Long, Delaware Blockchain Initiative: Transforming the 
Foundational Infrastructure of Corporate Finance, HARVARD LAW SCH. FORUM ON CORP. 
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REGULATION (Mar. 16, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/03/16/ 
delaware-blockchain-initiative-transforming-the-foundational-infrastructure-of-corporate-finance 
[https://perma.cc/98AV-WHHT]. 
 227 See Range, supra note 162. 
 228 See del Castillo, supra note 158. 
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III. THE IMPACT ON CORPORATE LAW 
The defining feature of traceable shares is that every unit of stock will 
have a clear chain of title identifying all current and prior owners. Stock will 
no longer need to be physically isolated and held in unidentified fungible 
bulk. In many cases, investors may not notice a difference: buyers can 
happily accept the economic rights that accompany each share without 
giving a second thought to the lineage of ownership history that accompanies 
this transfer of title. 
The elimination of fungible bulk holdings by intermediaries and the 
increased transparency of share provenance, however, would address some 
of the governance concerns described earlier in this Article. Voting rights 
would be exercised by current owners, rather than stockholders who sold 
their shares after the record date.229 Section 11 claimants could easily trace 
shares to establish standing.230 Appraisal litigants would no longer need to 
face indeterminate inquiries about how their shares have voted.231 The 
increased trust in accurate outcomes might bolster the use of other corporate 
governance mechanisms, such as shareholder proposals.232 On a more 
general note, the ability to track the granular histories of current and former 
shareholders might present opportunities to rethink foundational theories of 
corporate and shareholder responsibility. This Part considers each of these 
ideas in turn, offering some thoughts on how corporate law might benefit 
from traceable shares. 
A. Voting 
Firms with traceable shares should find it possible to significantly 
narrow the temporal decoupling of governance rights and economic interest. 
Voting power can remain attached to stock for a longer period of time, 
preventing sellers from voting shares they no longer own weeks or months 
after a trade. Indeed, investors might be able to continue buying and selling 
stock with voting power right up until the moment a vote is called. 
To be sure, advance notification of an election would still be required, 
so that shareholders (or potential shareholders) would have time to muster 
information, evaluate competing proposals, and make up their minds. But 
firms would no longer need to set a record date that severs voting rights far 
in advance of election day. There would be little need to move up and down 
through layers of custodial ownership to identify current holders, send them 
 
 229 See supra Section II.C.2. 
 230 See supra Section I.C.1.a. 
 231 See supra Section I.C.1.b. 
 232 See supra Section I.C.3. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
268 
the relevant information, and process voting instructions on their behalf. For 
example, a firm might announce on May 1 that all current shareholders on, 
say, 4:00 p.m. EDT on June 15 will have voting rights that will be tallied 
over the next twenty-four hours.233 These votes, many of which could be cast 
earlier than June 15 if desired, would be gathered, checked against the 
“golden ledger” of owners to ensure that each voting shareholder really did 
hold the shares on June 15 at 4:00 pm, and counted accordingly.234 
A centralized ledger of owners would also reduce the need to enlist 
brokers or proxy solicitation firms to track down beneficial owners and 
distribute voting materials. Shareholders would still need to receive the 
relevant information, including voting instructions, but this might now be 
accomplished with three overlapping strategies. First, upon announcement 
of an upcoming vote, all current shareholders could be sent this 
information—possibly drawing upon a contact database that is linked to their 
identification as owner in the distributed ledger. Second, as shares trade 
between this announcement date and the day that is designated for the vote, 
new purchasers could be sent this same information. Third, all of the voting 
materials might be uploaded to a central online repository,235 accessible by 
anyone who wants to watch from the sidelines while contemplating a 
possible acquisition of shares. Every vote will be verified by checking the 
stock ownership records against the timestamped distributed ledger database, 
so there should be no need to worry about former owners or unrelated parties 
casting fraudulent votes. These would be rejected as invalid. For this reason, 
it is even possible that ballots might be made available to anyone. 
Processing votes in this manner would result in a variety of benefits. 
The most obvious one is a reduction of unintentional errors, allowing firms 
to gain confidence in the accuracy of shareholder votes and minimizing the 
messy litigation that can occur when record holders make a mistake or fail 
to vote shares as instructed.236 Overvoting would also be screened out, 
recounts would be reduced, and there would no longer be a need to reconcile 
subtotals among various custodians or to worry about situations where the 
 
 233 Paper proxies might still be used for owners without online access or for long-term investors who 
will not change their positions and want to vote before the twenty-four-hour window—though some 
additional processing would obviously be required. 
 234 The identity of the person actually performing these validation and processing tasks presents other 
interesting questions, but it is likely that current tallying agents, like Broadridge, would migrate their 
business models to perform such services. It is also possible that the new platforms would offer these 
services directly. 
 235 This central online repository could perhaps be maintained by a leading proxy solicitation firm 
or vote-processing outsourcing vendor. 
 236 See, e.g., Kurz v. Holbrook, 989 A.2d 140, 153–54 (Del. Ch. 2010) (documenting voting mistakes 
by the record owner in a closely contested director election), rev’d sub nom. in part on other grounds, 
Crown EMAK Partners, LLC v. Kurz, 992 A.2d 377 (Del. 2010). 
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aggregate share count of custodial banks and brokers does not match the total 
number of shares issued by the firm.237 
This new system might also help deter some of the undesirable 
consequences of empty voting, where franchise rights are exercised without 
economic interest.238 By linking votes to share ownership for a longer period 
of time, there would be fewer situations where loose votes are available for 
sale or manipulation.239 To be sure, rewiring the exchange infrastructure 
would only address a small part of this problem. It still might be possible for 
an aspiring empty voter to buy and hold the actual shares, thereby retaining 
the vote, while hedging away the economic risks of ownership through swaps 
or other derivative transactions.240 It would take other, more comprehensive 
solutions to close down empty voting entirely. 
Similarly, even a perfect golden ledger of owners is unlikely to be a 
panacea for shareholder voting concerns. Information might be sent to 
outdated addresses. Changes to votes might remain difficult to count, 
especially if votes continue to be cast though the mail.241 Many shareholders 
might remain rationally apathetic, ignoring their perfectly traceable voting 
rights just as regularly as they ignore the current missives to submit voting 
instructions from custodial brokers.242 More generally, large mutual funds 
and other institutional holders could continue to cast votes according to a 
prearranged formula—perhaps hewing to the advice received from third-
party proxy advisory firms. If so, this could drown out much of the impact 
 
 237 See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
 238 See Jordan M. Barry et al., On Derivatives Markets and Social Welfare: A Theory of Empty Voting 
and Hidden Ownership, 99 VA. L. REV. 1103, 1120–24 (2013); Hu & Black, New Vote Buying, supra 
note 10, at 828–36 (describing the concerns with empty voting); Robert B. Thompson & Paul H. Edelman, 
Corporate Voting, 62 VAND. L. REV. 129, 160–62, 174–75 (2009) (arguing for a ban on share voting by 
parties with no economic interest). 
 239 Relatedly, the wisdom of allowing shareholder votes to be sold in public or private markets has 
been debated for some time. For more on this topic, see Henry G. Manne, Some Theoretical Aspects of 
Share Voting: An Essay in Honor of Adolf A. Berle, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1427–28 (1964) (advocating 
unrestricted vote selling), and Thompson & Edelman, supra note 238, at 162–66 (doubting the wisdom 
of vote sales). 
 240 This was the strategy employed in the now-famous Mylan–King merger, where a large 
shareholder in the target firm purchased shares in the acquiring firm so he could vote for the transaction 
on both sides to increase the odds of approval and thereby realize a large premium on his target shares. 
See Thompson & Edelman, supra note 238, at 153–54. In implementing this strategy, the shareholder 
hedged away his economic interest in the acquiring firm—calling into question whether his ability to vote 
was really in the best interest of the acquiring firm’s owners. Id. 
 241 If shareholders are still able to switch positions by revoting their shares, then processing firms 
will need to establish which vote came last. Arguably, allowing shareholders to change their minds by 
revoting shares might be less important with traceable shares because it is easier to wait until the date of 
the vote, but it may still be beneficial to offer this flexibility in the event that, say, a new suitor emerges 
in a corporate takeover situation. 
 242 See supra note 113 and accompanying text. 
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of voting with traceable shares in an era when more and more shareholding 
occurs through intermediaries.243 
Nevertheless, tighter voting links should chip away at the problem of 
voter apathy. As weak as the incentives are for some shareholders to vote, 
they are generally far worse for former shareholders. Eliminating the record 
date gap might also spark buying sprees where hedge funds or other activist 
purchasers seek to obtain meaningful positions in a firm in order to exercise 
franchise rights and influence an election as the voting date nears. 
B. Shareholder Lawsuits 
Traceable shares will also offer clarity in situations where legal rights 
are linked to an earlier disposition of specific shares and shareholders must 
prove this link to exercise their rights. Again, Section 11 litigation and 
appraisal valuation claims provide useful examples that illustrate the effect 
that adopting distributed ledger technology would have on shareholder 
lawsuits. 
1. Section 11 Litigation 
Recall the primary problem with Section 11 litigation: plaintiffs who 
purchase shares on the secondary market are allowed to sue for fraudulent 
registration statements, but only if they can prove (with absolute certainty) 
that they bought shares issued during the tainted filing.244 In a trading system 
that relies on fungible bulk, it is usually impossible to trace downstream 
shares back up to the problematic registration statement.245 
With traceable shares, however, the inquiry should become routine. A 
plaintiff would run a query on each of her shares to examine the chain of title 
and determine which ones qualify for a Section 11 claim. Notions of 
statistical tracing, heritage tracing, or obscure legal methods for tracing 
 
 243 Concerns related to the voting of mutual funds and other aggregate and large yet passive 
institutional owners present a host of important and difficult governance questions. See, e.g., Kahan & 
Rock, supra note 146, at 1426–30. Other commentators have chronicled how increased voting obligations 
for these firms have led to increased reliance on proxy advisory firms—who are happy to advise 
(sometimes reluctant) mutual fund managers on how to cast votes. See, e.g., George W. Dent., Jr., A 
Defense of Proxy Advisors, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1287. This can have a large influence as more and 
more investors purchase market index funds through large intermediaries. One interesting question, 
beyond the scope of this Article, is whether it might be possible and worthwhile for individual mutual 
funds to use distributed ledger technology to “pass through” proportional voting rights to their ultimate 
investors. For instance, an investor who owns 1000 shares of Vanguard’s Total Market Index Fund might 
see this position translate into voting rights for two shares of Apple stock. It is not clear that pass-through 
voting is practical or desirable, for a variety of reasons (including an increase in shareholder apathy upon 
receiving hundreds of fractional voting rights), but the topic is worth considering. 
 244 See supra notes 46–57 and accompanying text. 
 245 See supra Section I.C.2.a. 
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shares would become obsolete because no inferences are needed.246 Indeed, 
a plaintiff could conceivably bring a class action on behalf of all shareholders 
who currently own the stock issued by the offending registration statement.247 
The practical effect of this development, then, would be to resurrect Section 
11 liability for secondary market purchasers. This may be a desirable policy 
because it would offer proportional deterrence for fraud.248 That is, firms 
would not be able to evade liability by invoking impossible tracing 
obligations, but they would also not face excessive liability from all 
downstream secondary market purchasers. Only the exact number of shares 
issued via the fraudulent registration statement would be eligible to recover. 
2. Appraisal Claims 
Turning to the appraisal context, recall that these claims are not allowed 
for shares that vote in favor of a triggering transaction, even though it is often 
impossible to determine how any given share has been voted.249 Courts must 
therefore rely on aggregate vote counts by the record holder (typically Cede) 
to set an upper limit on the number of shares that will qualify for appraisal.250 
Apportioning eligible shares among multiple claimants is indeterminate. 
By contrast, traceable shares would offer a clean solution to the 
appraisal identity problem. The first benefit would arise through the 
narrowing of the voting gap, as described above. Because purchasing 
shareholders could obtain the vote much closer to the actual date of a 
decision, there would be less need to argue about how late-purchased shares 
had been voted by others. Instead, dissenters could buy shares, retain the 
vote, and offer evidence that their shares qualified for appraisal because they 
had voted no. Moreover, a reduction in custodial processing should eliminate 
both agency errors, as seen in the Dell case,251 and disputes about whether a 
plaintiff’s specific shares qualified for appraisal rights where Cede formally 
casts a large cluster of fungible share votes. In other words, there would be 
no need to debate whether a custodial record holder had cast enough 
nonpositive votes to support all claims or to worry about how to allocate a 
limited pool of qualified shares among multiple appraisal claimants. 
Plaintiffs acquiring shares after a merger announcement, but before the vote, 
could vote directly on the deal. 
 
 246 See, e.g., Sean Belcher, Note, Tracing the Invisible: Section 11’s Tracing Requirement and 
Blockchain, 16 COL. TECH. L.J. 145 (2017). 
 247 For additional discussion of the history and evolution of Section 11 litigation claims, see 
Steinberg & Kirby, supra note 64, at 1–31. 
 248 Cf. Grundfest, supra note 55, at 56–58 (discussing the optimal scoping of Section 11 liability). 
 249 See supra Section I.C.2.b. 
 250 See supra notes 92–98 and accompanying text. 
 251 See supra notes 82–89 and accompanying text. 
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Some tricky situations could persist. Imagine, for instance, that a 
shareholder votes yes on a merger but then sells the share before the deadline 
to process votes. The new purchaser should retain rights to revote this share 
against the deal and, thereby, resurrect an appraisal claim. In order to retain 
these rights, however, the verification protocols for determining how this 
specific share voted would need to screen out the earlier selling shareholder’s 
vote. This would require the creation of additional screening protocols to 
match up the full slate of votes against the final golden ledger of 
shareholders. 
Interesting trading events might also arise if a gap remains between the 
period when votes are due and the deadline for filing an appraisal claim. I 
have suggested above that this gap may be short, but it is still possible that 
bifurcated markets would emerge where some buyers seek to find traceable 
shares that did not vote in favor of a transaction to amplify their pending 
appraisal claims. This development could present new marketing and pricing 
questions (would shares linked to different voting positions trade for 
different amounts?), while also creating new opportunities for brokers 
looking to obtain specific types of shares for their clients. Other interesting 
situations might occur with the fragmentation of share markets. To the extent 
that the record date gap can be minimized or eliminated with better clearing 
technology, however, these puzzles will disappear. 
C. Shareholder Proposals, Proxy Fights, and Information Transparency 
Traceable shares and the creation of a centralized, real-time shareholder 
database would also likely impact some other levers of corporate 
governance, including shareholder proposals and proxy contests. Currently, 
it can be difficult to lead successful shareholder initiatives that either moot a 
contentious issue or advocate a rival slate of directors. Some of this expense 
stems from the need to comply with detailed requirements governing proxy 
communications with shareholders.252 But another category of expense arises 
through the practical need to conduct a political campaign by hiring advisors 
(typically lawyers and proxy solicitation firms) to track beneficial owners 
though labyrinths of intermediary owners and lobby for marginal votes.253 A 
 
 252 The primary regulatory framework arises under Section 14(a) of the 1934 Securities Exchange 
Act, which prohibits parties from soliciting proxies (defined broadly) in violation of SEC rules. These 
rules go on to require anyone soliciting a proxy to prepare and distribute a proxy statement to 
shareholders. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-3 to -5 (2018) (codifying Rules 14a-3, 14a-4, and 14a-5). 
 253 One recent contest, for example, cost an estimated $60 million or more. See Julie Creswell, An 
Epic, and Costly, Boardroom Battle at Procter & Gamble, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/08/business/economy/an-epic-and-costly-boardroom-battle-at-
procter-gamble.html [https://perma.cc/7LNF-GVTP] (“[T]he two sides will have spent at least $60 
million, and probably tens of millions more, as they try to sway investors to their point of view.”). 
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centralized database of owners might help to cut these transaction costs and 
increase the practical use of shareholder initiatives for a wider range of 
qualified governance concerns.254 
A renewed interest in shareholder governance initiatives, including the 
important battlegrounds of bylaw modifications and proxy fights, seems 
likely. As mentioned earlier in this Article, it is possible that uncertainty 
about the integrity of voting has prevented legal reforms aimed at creating 
broader shareholder governance.255 Lawmakers might be willing to rethink 
elective or mandatory investor governance initiatives in the wake of cleaner 
voting infrastructure. 
While it is difficult to know whether the use of alternative governance 
strategies would really increase with traceable shares, decisions about what 
information regarding current shareholders is provided to the public will 
impact any evolution in this direction. On one extreme, we can imagine that 
distributed ledgers might make shareholder information fully transparent. 
They could offer real-time data about the identification and ownership stake 
of all shareholders to anyone. This would allow disgruntled shareholders to 
easily contact other influential owners, while also providing information 
about changes in insider holdings. On the other hand, this level of 
transparency may introduce privacy concerns, and it is possible that any 
golden ledger of shareholders might only be made visible to managerial 
insiders. If this latter path is taken, then very interesting questions will arise 
about the circumstances under which an outside shareholder (or other party) 
should be able to access this data.256 
D. Corporate Liability and Shareholder Responsibility 
Finally, the development of traceable shares might even allow 
lawmakers to rethink fundamental principles of shareholder responsibility 
for corporate misdeeds. To date, holding former shareholders directly 
accountable for any corporate offenses that arose during their ownership 
tenure has been exceedingly rare.257 In light of the new information that 
 
 254 Indeed, I would predict that one implication of easier coordination among shareholders will be an 
emphasis on the availability of proxy access for board elections. 
 255 See supra Section I.C.3. 
 256 In Delaware, it is likely that this information could be obtained under a shareholder books and 
records request governed by Title 8 § 220 of the Delaware Code. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (West 
2006). But the constantly changing ledger of shareholders might raise new questions. For example, would 
a firm have an ongoing obligation to provide current ownership updates to an outside shareholder for a 
given period of time (as opposed to a static snapshot) if a proper purpose is established? 
 257 The primary exception, of course, is found in a claim to pierce the corporate veil. See, e.g., Robert 
B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1036 (1991). These 
lawsuits mostly arise in the context of tort or contract claims by outside parties against current 
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traceable shares could offer, however, established notions of corporate and 
shareholder liability might need to be reexamined. For instance, the ability 
to trace shares could address the allocation of shareholder liability in the 
context of 10b-5 fraud on the market claims.258 
One of the more important developments in corporate liability arose 
when the Supreme Court accepted fraud on the market in connection with a 
10b-5 misrepresentation claim.259 Reaffirmed in 2014,260 this doctrine allows 
shareholders to sue for corporate misrepresentations in connection with a 
trade, even when the investor did not hear the misleading statement.261 The 
premise is that plaintiffs should be able to rely on the integrity of the market 
itself and the idea that prices will quickly react to the release of public 
corporate misstatements.262 As a practical matter, fraud on the market 
facilitates class action securities litigation because plaintiff shareholders no 
longer need to demonstrate common issues of individual reliance.263 
This theory has generated controversy.264 One set of concerns arises 
from the complex economic effects that can result from a judgment against 
the firm. Consider an illustrative fact pattern: the head of investor relations 
issues a press release stating that something really good has occurred—
perhaps the firm has struck oil in a remote location. The firm’s share price 
leaps from $30 to $50 in response, but the statement is a total lie. One 
shareholder, Albert, decides to sell 100 shares for unrelated reasons and 
pockets the $5000. Another shareholder, Byron, doesn’t learn of the 
statement, but he decides to buy the 100 shares for $5000. A third 
shareholder, Constance, has owned 100 shares of the firm for years, and she 
holds her stock throughout this time period. Several weeks later, with the 
shares still trading at $50 per share, the lie is revealed, and the price falls 
back to $30 per share. Byron files a 10b-5 action against the firm, alleging 
fraud on the market. 
 
shareholders; they do not typically involve shareholder lawsuits and transfers from former to current 
shareholders, as discussed in this Section. 
 258 See generally 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2018). 
 259 This took place in 1988 with Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243–45 (1988). For a 
contemporary assessment of the case and its impact, see Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Good 
Finance, Bad Economics: An Analysis of the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1059 
(1990). 
 260 Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2408 (2014). 
 261 Id. 
 262 Id. 
 263 Id. at 2412. 
 264 See, e.g., William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Political Economy of Fraud on the 
Market, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 69 (2011); Macey & Miller, supra note 259; Paul G. Mahoney, Precaution 
Costs and the Law of Fraud in Impersonal Markets, 78 VA. L. REV. 623, 663 (1992). 
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Byron seems to have a good case, under the theory that he paid too 
much for the stock. True, he did not hear the false claim, or purchase his 
stock in direct reliance on the statement, but fraud on the market should allow 
Byron to win a lawsuit against the firm. He recovers $2000 (100 times $20), 
reflecting the higher amount that he had to pay when the market price rose 
in response to the firm’s lie. Economically, however, this money does not 
materialize from thin air. The $2000 in damages is effectively borne by other 
current shareholders, as residual claimants of the firm’s assets. If there are 
1000 total shares, for instance, then each share should decline by $2 to reflect 
the decrease in cash. This general phenomenon—and the fact that corporate 
liability must ultimately be borne by residual owners who may have had 
absolutely nothing to do with the firm’s misdeeds—is a perennial concern.265 
This problem becomes especially salient if we consider the plight of our 
other individual investors. Constance owned shares worth $3000 at the time 
of the lie. Her position briefly jumps to $5000 but then drops to $2800 after 
the shares return to $30 per share when the lie is revealed, and then drop to 
$28 per share when Byron wins and the damages are paid out by the firm. 
Given that Constance was a shareholder when the shareholders elected the 
firm directors, who in turn, appointed the rogue managers, a case might be 
made for holding her responsible for the misdeeds of the insider managers 
under a principal–agent relationship. Many people, however, would consider 
her a victim of the agency cost problem; any culpability is highly attenuated. 
Albert, on the other hand, should be delighted by this turn of events. He 
was expecting to receive $3000, but when the stock price jumped to $50 per 
share right before his liquidation, he was able to cash out at a much higher 
price. 
Historically, the law has never worried much about benefits to 
shareholders like Albert.266 Investors who benefit from corporate 
misrepresentations—whether by selling too high in the presence of false 
good news (like Albert) or by buying too low in the presence of false bad 
news—are simply allowed to keep their profits. At least part of the reason 
for this approach seems to come from an administrative inability to trace 
shares. We might be able to determine, in a rough sense, the timing of when 
someone changes their economic position, but no losing party could link 
shares back to an individual gaining investor. 
The presence of traceable shares, however, might conceivably change 
the way that lawmakers think about corporate liability and shareholder 
 
 265 See supra note 2. 
 266 See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 264, at 93–94; Frank H. Easterbook & Daniel R. Fischel, 
Optimal Damages in Securities Cases, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 611, 635 (1985). 
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responsibility. Should we be willing to claw back the gains from Albert in 
this example? Indeed, holding the benefitting investor responsible might 
represent a classic case of restitution.267 A full exploration of this possibility, 
and the wisdom of invoking restitution doctrines in similar circumstances, is 
beyond the scope of this Article. Still, the example should begin to illustrate 
how profound structural changes related to corporate and shareholder 
responsibility will become possible with traceable shares. 
CONCLUSION 
Traceable shares may seem like a minor development for corporate law. 
Indeed, many people probably assume that we already track individual 
ownership histories. Yet this is not the case. New technology that creates 
traceable shares would therefore represent a significant change and offer 
some intriguing possibilities for improved corporate governance. Indeed, it 
may even prompt lawmakers to reconsider fundamental notions of corporate 
liability and shareholder responsibility. 
More accurate stock clearing and settlement systems should also 
influence scholarly debates about the optimal structure of corporate 
governance. Many commentators continue to focus on the right way to 
balance power between shareholders and managers. Shareholder rights 
advocates push for reforms, like increased proxy access and disarmed 
antitakeover defenses, to bolster shareholder power. Advocates of director 
primacy continue to assert that shareholder activism brings strategic 
ignorance and sows dysfunctional leadership teams. They insist that most 
governance matters should be left to inside managers. Moderates see ills in 
both extremes and work to design better checks and balances via corporate 
law reforms. The availability of a more accurate system for tabulating votes 
and parsing out other legal rights might cause some scholars to reconsider 
their positions. 
Moreover, all commentators should agree on one principle: a well-
functioning system of corporate voting is critical to any healthy governance 
regime. Proponents of shareholder democracy cannot argue for greater 
participation rights if the legitimacy of resulting tallies is suspect. And those 
who advocate for board deference do so on the bedrock of authority that 
reliable shareholder elections supposedly confer. The proper scope of 
 
 267 The law of restitution seeks to avoid unjust results under the general principle that “unjust 
enrichment must be disgorged.” See Douglas Laycock, The Scope and Significance of Restitution, 67 TEX. 
L. REV. 1277, 1278 (1989). According to Laycock, this body of law “consists largely of blank spaces 
with undefined borders and only scattered patches of familiar ground.” Id. at 1277. Restitution might 
therefore provide an intriguing remedy to recoup “undeserved” benefits from ex-shareholders, but the 
theory would require more extended analysis. 
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governance power is subject to debate and centers on disagreements about 
managerial agency costs and shareholder information deficits. What matters 
to everyone, however, is the fitness of the underlying system used to stuff 
the ballot boxes. Traceable shares cannot put these longstanding corporate 
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